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THE MILITA R'! IN ECUADQR: 
The ?olicies ana Polities of Authoritarian Rule 
INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION TO 197 2 
It is neither novel no r original to observe that an 
Intellectual faddls hness has characterl~ed political studies of 
Lattn A.merlea,1 SOllle of our most f r uitful rese areh--and also SOtll8 
0: the most (0011",h--ha5 either deliberately or accidentally 
responded to contefllporary affairs, to th e ~rends or the moment . For 
example , it is evident that the instal lation of nVlIlerou,:, 
authoritarian regimes and their continuing presence , especially In 
th~ 19705, Influenced writings abOut the break do wn of democracies 
~nd the presumably historical emergence of bureaucratic 
~uthorl tarla nl sm . 2 The subs equen t reversal of the~e po l itical 
trends encourased a reexamination of del'llocratlc systems. if sOOle'olhat 
belatedly.3 In 1979 Ecuado r b ecame the first South American nation 
in '"hlch a mil itary government declared and carrled out a voluntary 
return to the barracks. 
Strongly encou rag ed by a new administration in loIashington , 4 the 
Ecuadorean government of the Armed For ces in 1976 rel uc tantly and 
painflJlly negotiated a three -y ear retreat that led to a newly 
elec t ed c:onstitutio nal governm ent in QlJ ito for the first time in 
nine yearll . Since that till", the military establishment hilS lIought 
to consoli da te its Institution"l galns and protect its corporilte 
interes t s , wh lle someWh a t s uspi oiously watching the car n l v"l e sque 
3 
partlsanllhlp of cIvilian ('ule. In Doth 1986 and 1987, the elected 
government wa s severely shaken by publIc ~il1tary dissidence, 
provoked partly. it' not entirely, by the uncompromIsing ferocity of 
the chlllr 8 ltecutive and the unyieldIng antagonism of hili political 
opposItion. 'ihe ability of President Leon Febrell Cordero to serve 
out his f ull term until its consti t ut i onal co nclusion I n August 1988 
resulted l argely from the electoral campaign and espeolally the 
endu!"lng trauIII8 of the March 1987 natural dl"88ter that struck the 
republic. S 
I t shOuld be borne In mind that this study is part or a 
oollectlve undertaking that IIxamlne", m11itary Institutions under 
conservative authoritarIan r'Ul e . 6 Its preoccupatlonl:l have inClu ded 
the impact of the military on economic policy and regime 
performance ; military l in kages "11th Civilian interest g l'oups ; and 
the functioning of the military power Bt ructure. For organizational 
conv enlerloe, mos~ of thIs paper '01111 be devoted to tlofO major 
sections. The first will focus primarily on poli c y . "11th at tentI on 
to decision making and regime performance . The second will e~amlne 
more directly issues of pollt!cs, emb racIng the place or the 
(IIllitary in society and the eYolutiorl of ties with major Irlterest 
groups. Before moving lrlto these dlscu!:l"ions, ho wev er , further 
background Is appropriate. Cer t ainly the irlstltutlonal e vol u tion of 
the Ecuadorean :nllltary prior to the 1970s is mandatory. Moreover, 
at least a fe w words about the stgnlrlcance and Implicatio ns of 
regimes may be in order. 
4 
Regimes and Policy-Making 
The concern with r eg i me type~ and with syst e m!c characteristics 
has persisted in the liter ature o n l.atin American politics for some 
years.7 Fr om the ethn ocentric a n d prescriptive analyses of 
pluralis m and liberal de mocracy begI nn I ng in the 1950,. through mOre 
recent formulations o f corpor atist models and authoritar ianism , 
scho l ars have elabora t e d on i deal types as a means of f urthering 
understandi ng a nd refining theoretical perspectives . Subs e quent 
dissatisfaction with earlter heuristic models led to a reexamination 
of inte l lectual underpinnIngs. While this evolving p r oces s has had 
~rlgn t and dim spots. the literature has manifested re l ative l y fe wer 
efrective efforts to probe the l inkages be t ween policy and regime 
type . This t endency has prevai l ed, despite the historical l y lar ge 
~ l gn l ficance of th e state in Latin A~erica . 
Standing as a powerful and Independent enti ty , the ,;tate 
COnst i tutes "the prime regulator , coordinator , and pace-setter of 
t he enti r e n a t i o nal system , t h e apex of the Lat i n American pyramid 
from which patronage, wealth, power, an d programs rIow . ,,8 The 
character of the state, the type of regime In ques ti on , is therefore 
crucial with regard to policy - maki ng. One must proceed f r om the 
basic assu mption that the nature of r egi me Is a significan t variable 
in the c haract e r and cont e nt of policy. To be sure, ambiguity and 
dlssensus exist over the significance of regime . As Steven Hughes 
and Kenneth Mi j eski have observed, 
It Is clear . . from even a cu r sory review or the rel e vant 
literature tha t no consensus exists as to what a r e the cr i tical 
defi n ing characteristics of a regime type. Moreover , th e re is 
conSiderable dissensus Over the issue of whether or not 
dirterent r eg i~e~ aeco~nC tor any s ystema tic differences In 
publia policy. If a nything , that dlsse nsu 5 III lIIost acu te a mong 
lItuderlts of the politics o f l.at l n Amer ica.9 
As they note. eyen Aristotle .... a3 sOmewhat uncertain. tor he argued 
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that any regime , g i ven Its particular soci a l .structure , might behave 
jus tly o r unjustly. SOCial condit ions could be more decl s !v e , th en , 
than actual regime type. 
or 1II0l"e recent vintage 15 Charles Anderson ' s claSSiC study of 
poll tic, and economic development, In which he categor ized regimes 
as conventional , democratlo-refQrmlst. and r evolutionary. The 
Ideologies of each type were e xamined In terms of polIcy patterns 
and OUtputs. In the end, Anderson was lntL~ldated by the ab.sence of 
aggregate data a nd caSI stud ies for the period a fter World War II . 
In his '~ork publl~ hed t'"'O de cade'll alto, he u l timately co nt ended that 
tew policy style~ · ... ere as di~tlnctively clear - cu t as !lchol ar!l might 
~rgU;!. ThUll , 
Military gove rnm ents t ended to engage In largl-:Icale pub liC 
works project'll , ami so d id other t ype~ of regime . In some 
cases, poli t ical Stability anel "no- nonsense" government 
cont ribu t eel to eoonomlc growth, a nd in o t her cases did not. 
Large - .scale public enterprise was generated by r e gi mes 
espousing natlonal1sm and soel"l r eform but Just a~ frequently 
by militantl y co nserv a ti ve governments.IO 
Moving to· ... ard a considera t i on ot mill t ary ru le I n EC lIador, 
then, tho! que:l t lon over regime t ype and publIc polley relllains 
unreso l ved. Karen Rammer's dl:1cussion r i ghtly demonstrated the 
exi:ltence of at least three Iden t ifiabl e school:! of thought In 
contention . One holds th a t mil itary reg i mes are lIIore 
<levelopl!lental!!:It in polley than the civili an; another ta kel:l the 
= 
6 
oppo~lte pOll1tloni th e thi rd as .. ert s that regime type is not 
. slgnlrloant. Mer r-evlew of t he literature In the late 19108 found 
litt l e to suggest that regime dlf fe renoes were h ig hly Influential on 
publlc policy . Further!llOre. ~underlylng socl0 ·econollllc conditions 
Impose s uch basic constraints on polit ical actops t hat I t lIIa kes 
Little dlrt.renee ,.hether they are 01 villan or mill tary . n11 
1et Remme l" did not conc ede t hs game, st ating that It was 
~prematureH to conclude th at regime typf.l is unllllportant f or 
understa nding public polloy In L.atln America . 'olhat Is not frui tful 
Is an Qve rslmpllst lc civilian-military dichotomy , "Ihl oh Is orten too 
broadl y or crudely drawn. If emplrloal studlel! have not 
conc lusively establis hed strong r elati onships be tween regime type 
and public polley In Latin "merica , the basiC Linkage has remained 
... nc lear, Remmel" has continued to pur9ue the3e Is3ues , no tably In 
he r coauthored wo rk with Gilbert Herkx In dissecting 'l)ureaucratic-
Ju~ho rltarlan theorl ztng.12 Her concerns have been shared by 
others, I ncluding Hl.lghes a nd MIJeskl. A heuristic schema 
dlfrer entiate9 among democratic, authorltarian, and totalitarian 
regimes. A. l.lthor ita rlan regi mes hav e been s l.lbdivl ded Into military , 
tradttlonal ci vi l ian, and bureaucratic - author itarian subtype", . 
lihllft this dlscl.l"slon could lead too far aflei d. it Is wor th 
repe a ting Hughe", an(! Mlje",ki ' s contention that wane of the mor e 
Intereating ql.le3 t lon", to be addressed by s tudent s of politics 1s 
whether or not there i" a connection between different regimes and 
dtrferent patterns of public pol1cy.~13 Ce rtainly t his question 
co nstitutes a c l assic issue of political theory and ph i losophy and 
requires a few words on the regime-policy ralatlonshlp . 
7 
The evolution o f the dichotomy , whi ch has been inc r easingly 
challenged, ean be vlewe4 In some part as :oenectlng the polltieal 
patterns or the day In Latin A~erlca - -and es pe cial l y perceptions of 
these patter n:! in the U.S . academic co mmun i ty . During the heyday of 
democratle pl uralism , i t s ad he r e nts inSisted that th e democra t ic 
regime , based on popul ar so ve r ei gn t y , el ections , and r espect for 
citizen par'ticipatio n, presumably permi tt ed the con.!lide r atio n of 
diverse interests and an I nstitutionalization or peaceful resolu t ion 
or conflict. DemocratiC reforms would accel erate state enterp r is e s , 
expand centralized power and control, encourage proresslonall:sm, "nd 
erfectlvely respond to national needs. Al t hough a slo~ and 
cuml)er"ome approach, it would nonethele",,,, produce In due course the 
mo"t efrectiv e and me an ingfu l pollcy r e3 pOnS !l to problem" of 
natio na l development . If only impatie nce over tr an"ltOry de l sy" a nd 
dis r uptions cou ld be curl)ed , the more enduring benefits 1o'0\,l1d be 
d"Jly bestowed upon a ll deser ving ~emb er s of the polity. 
Thls satisfy ingly r osy portrayal of events gradually dark ened 
as events during t he second half of the 1960s seemed ever more 
dt"couraging . At fir:lt stage ~hl",pers . then open criticism argued 
that policy could not be e xecu ted through pluralistio sy"tems whe re 
co nf lict a nd opposition could o u tst ri p pop ular support and nasce nt 
sy"U mlC legitimacy. Cl rC llmstanoes lent thems e l ve s to ", ll oh 
observations a,. that of Juan Llnz , who wrote that In "oclet l e" 
"ufferlng Injustice and cultural division , ~I t I" difricult to 
accord Intellectual justification to a system In which tile will of 
the electorate, the technicall tie:! of the law-makine: process, a nd 
the deoislon of th e courts can serve t o maintain a social o r der that 
8 
arouses moral indIgnation or, conversely, Can allow a reformi"t 
majority to question an inherited value system." I l< 
AuthoritarIa nI s m therefore bec ame posIted increasIngly as the 
regIme type most supportive of effective policy-making and 
management. It 'las alleged that centraliz:ed , coercive military 
gover nment woul d assure the level of public order necessary for the 
promotion of dev e lo pment . The mi litary in conjunction with civilian 
technocrats and foreIgn capital would become the new elite that 
"el iminat es electoral competition and severely controls the 
poli tic a l participation of the popular sector . PUblic policy is 
ce ntrally concerned ",lth promoting advanced industrlall:?;ation.,,15 A 
technocratic policy style would emerge, while policies cOll i d be 
Identified and i mp le::len~ed through the "technical ly rational" 
pllrsuit of the twin objectives of stability and growth . 16 Among 
t ~, ose "ho were somewhat skeptical, it seemed self - evident that while 
, "' thorl~arlanism might deal readily with short - term measures, 
su~talned developm e n t could scarcely be assumed . ind eed, prornlse~ 
of future gain "that appear to be contradicted by regress I ve 
measures that accelerate the concentration of resources and widen 
disparities between rural an d urban life only perpetuate t he kind s 
of social conf lict~ the mi litary abhors. ,,17 
With either the author itarian or the pluralist regime, In the 
l.a ti n American setting t h ere eXists Inherent fai th In the ability of 
the state to plan a nd direct polley . There has evolved a broad 
acceptance of the notion t hat the state should determine the rules 
of the economic game , utilizing its authority to mani pula te them in 
the quest for long - range developmen t al objectives. If distinctions 
~~---------------------------
e x ist betwee n r egl me s-_ev e n th e cru de c lvl1 1an-~illtary dlchot o~y-­
then lndl~Ldual case ~tudiea and the gather ing or empirical data 
bec ome Imp ortan t. Tha need eXis t s to r etlne t heoreti c a l co nstructs 
and st rengthen t he avai l a b le ma teria l s that ca n afford greater 
ins i gh t Is possib le. Such effor ts at r e finem en t can li nk regi me", 
with sig n ificant c haracteristics ot pol1cy-maldng. Hav ing said 8 2 
much , one perhap s might set aside th e (amiliar caveats OVer the 
limitations or ideal types and s impU:ltlc diChotomies While briany 
synthe",i>;ing ttloae poll e y characterist ics customarily asc ri bed to 
a uth oritarian an(\ to plur a lis t r egi mes. 
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The tormer has bee n viewed as tI gh tly cent raliz ed, with 
pol1tlcal power e xer cilled by a <lmall group o f per llons . Thill 
l~ aderll hi p 15 elitis t In values and In app r oach . The 3ys te:ll 15 
clolled In the lIenlie that conflict III con trol led o r contained by 
~ha tever me thod 9 necellllary . Fai t h In the abili ty o f the state to 
d irect national dev elopme nt is accompanied by the belief o f the 
Ar:o ed For cell th at nO other gro up Is cap a ble of do ing 30. Dome!ltic 
forcell are thus to be d eni ed access to polley-mak ing, mass 
partlctpa t io n ill pr oscribed , an d poli ti cal acti vity beyond th e 
narrow confinell of the leadership ill Illegitimate. Under such 
conditions , demands are created by th e s tate , and the process of 
lItu dying a nd r<l sponding to them III organica lly un ified . Littl e need 
ex illts for barga ining wi t h In t er nal o rganizat io n:! and Interellt 
groups , th<Js t he regime enj oys solidarity and p r ellents a monolithic 
f r ont when negotiating and bargaini ng . Thi s uni ty Is fur th e r 
enha nced by a ho mogeneous Ideo l ogy or we ltansch auung gu idi ng thos e 
who e xercille authority. 
The opposing abst~act1on 1s allegedly typIcal of the civilian, 
dellloc~atic plu~allst ~egi!l'le. The institutIons of state gove~nance 
a~e de facto decent~all~ed th~ough the Inte~play of the executive 
b~anch , the legislature , autonolllous state agencies , plus reglonal 
and local gov e rnments. The leade~8hlp i", popula~, representing the 
value, and inte rests of t he c1tl2:enry . Th e system is open , wit h 
conflict a hallmar k of daily aotivity. Dome",tlc f o r ces and groups 
are permitted . i ndeed encouraged t o participate . This app ~ oach 
assures that decIsion makers will be adequately apprised of 
alternatives. As Ande r son wrote. the decisIon make~ is requIred to 
consider sooletal needs as a oonsequenoe of the systelllio prooess of 
representation . The resultant oon f rontatlon of diverse ,eotor, In 
the formulatIon of publlo policy then stimula t es t he neoessary 
linkage betwee n that policy and private-uector perror mance .1 8 
The assumptions accompanying the demo cr atIc rules of the game 
c ede legItimacy to t he multitude of groups and to theIr Involvement, 
with ma8S partIcipation being invari ably desirable. Demands from 
socIety reveal sys temic attitudes and prererences . DecisIons 
require bargaining with the plethora or rep~esentatlve dOaJestlo 
groups , thereby stimulating di~ un lty and disco~d. Policymake~s 
Under the de mocratic system must sxecute policies ... ithou t alienating 
eit he r domestic or for eIgn entrepreneur s , ever conscious that 
poltein aJa y lead t o economic hard shi ps , whi eh are be li eved to ruel 
sentiment ror aJilitary intervention. Within th e LatIn American 
oontext, an acceleratIon of state enter prises will ooour as we ll as 
an e xpansion of economio power by the gove~nlllent . The democratio 
pluralIst sha~es wit h his o r he~ authoritari an policy-making 
" 
counterpart the Idea " that the state should determine the rul e s or 
the econollli C game and use it'll po,.er to lI'lanlpulate them In p",rsuit o f 
long-te rm development obJeettves.n19 
Thi s perhaps overlong prolegomena has been Intended t o indicate 
the need to e xamine poUelts Io' ithln the conte xt of regime types and 
charac teristics. Without further repetition of argum ent. I t may 
noo6theL ess be useful to r es tate once the centrality of the statist 
tradltlorl In Latin Aille ri ca. John Sloan has desc r ibed. it we l l In 
declaring that Latin A1I!ericana have never bOJen attracted to the 
liberal state that merely plays "the r ole or referee among the 
coo-peting Interests Of socie t y and . . provi des la>l and order and 
a minimum level of public ser vl ces .,,20 Instead, the La tin AmerIcan 
state has come to be viewed as the ultima te patron , the dominant 
Institution In society. Wi t h the mounting drive f or modernl~ation 
a nd deVelopment , t he functions of Latin American governments have 
'll so expanded. 
At th is pOint , it bears !'<tpeating that any dlchotomous 
formulation of roughly traditional or innovativ e po l icy as 
hypothetically e~bodred In either authoritarian or libe ral plurali s t 
!'egillles Is unques t ionab ly oversllllpllstic . The Latin AmerLcan 
e Xperie nce has been richly diverse . For Instanee , Hughes and 
MIJeskl cite a study demons tr ating that educational and defense 
spending ref lect ed an inorementalist approaeh under both pluralist 
and authoritarian reg!mes.21 Enrique Blloyra's examination of 
'/ene~uelan all polleles al1d budgets over a thirty-year span found 
that na t ional petroleum policy was approached by civilian leadership 
with boldness , treating sueh policies as a high - stakes game . The 
• 
" 
prl!v10U5 dictatorial regi:!le, 1n contr ast , had been cautious and 
narrowly increlllental In the bellt traditional sense. 22 SueI'! rind lngs 
remind analysts of the need to avoid a prior i assumptions abou t 
policy strategies vis-A-vis r eglllle types. Regarding Ecua do r In 
recent lind contemporary times , let us now examine its auehoritarlan 
exp erience and, more broadly. the role of the Ecuador ean Armed. 
Forces both In pover and behind the scenes of ehillan plurall3t 
goverr'lmen t . 
Th e Tr aditionalist MIL i tary before 1972 
Anticipation o f t he chr onol ogical focus seemll \l saCul at this 
point. Conseq uently, my empIrical Inquiry will stress the seven 
years ot aJllltary government f rom 1972 to 1979 . Thl", period 
includes t he rtrs t four years und e r General Guill ermo ROdr!guez 
'.ara2 3 and the subsequent three under the trI ulllvir ate . thLs 
'x amlna tion wi ll al so look at the military under the conser vative 
governme nt of President ~e6n Febres Cor dero. a lthoug h l argely within 
the conte~ t of lIIilitary diSSidence , corporate factionalism, and a 
challenge t o systemic l egit i macy . Be fore entering i nt o a closer 
e xamination of events and forclls during thiS period, sOllie ge neral 
baokground may be helpful . A few admittedly rough and ready 
sketches .. Ill depict a military establ1shmen t t hat ",ntl l tha 1910s 
.. as no more modernized than other elements of the politi c a l system. 
The yea r s fro m Ec uado r- ea n indep e ndence until the early 
t .. entl eth century constituted an e r a o f military caudillOI;1 . In 
fact, the first half~century of the Independence period .. as " largely 
a ta la Of a se r ies of gene r als--flore .'!, Urb ina, Vel nt lml ll a~ -who 
, 3 
o.olllinated politiC.!! for re lati vely long periods of time, Interspersed 
with civil war,!! In which various military leaders con te~ted t o 
e!ltabl1~h their personal hegemony."2~ Ioihen the cacao - basE"! coastal 
plutocracy developed late In the 180011, it con tributed to a thlrty -
year period of 1..1beral political hegemony. But wh en th e economi c 
boom collap.sed with IHtia advance notice in 1922, the st agl! was .!let 
(or the l>11Lltary coup or 9 July 1925 . Which Illarket:! the appearanc e of 
the A.rmed forcee as an In.!ltitutional polit i cal actor . This .!IO-
calla4 Revolucion de JuliO, a move~ent made up predominantly o r 
young officers 3ee klng to overthro w the Guayaquil bU.!Ilness oligarChy 
ano. ~Iberal domination, 300n yie lded the stage to Civilian 
politiolans . 
Bet ween 1925 and 19QB, t wenty-one differen t governtllan t s ca.:!." 
anc1 lIent I n Ecuac1or, and yet such pronounced In!:l tabillty was not 
";larked by a dominant military r ole. Only three governmants afte r 
1931 were neadec1 by orOcers , two of whi Ch survivec1 less than a 
year . Only early I n the century had the flrllt step'" been t aken to 
professionalize the ",Ilitary , Which wa s 131011 to .. ave toward a 
corp orate entity with true pol iti cal power of It s own. The 
nineteenth-century pattern of military-political caudillos, acting 
a3 individuals, ga ve · ... ay only slowly and grudg ingly to a minimally 
profe~slonalized .. 11itary subordinated to civilian control . The 
rtrst foreigrl .. Illtary mls~lon was provided by Chile In 1903 , · ... hlle 
Irl 1922 , Ltallan advisor:! organized several specialized training 
schools fOr the Ecuadorean Ar",y. Meanwhile , recruitment for the 
o f ficer corps t hroug h creation of the Escue la Mll1tar began only In 
1925. In tl",e . recruitMent tur ned IncreaSingly toward the urban 
po 
III1dd1e ,nrata, <lnd tew ottlcers came from the national elite o r from 
wQrki~g ~class (alllll1e8.25 
Contrary to acc e pted fall( wisdom ab ollt L.etln Amerloa In 
general. the milita ry In Ecua do r remained a weak torclI 
Instit ut io nally desp ite the 10101" l evel ot pa r ty developllIent and the 
weakness or constitutional traditions. As John Samuel rltch has 
.... rltten authorltatlvaly . ~Hlnlmal ;H'ofes,lonallzatlon thus 
contributed to the political subordina tion or the armed f or ce s , with 
IndIvid ua l oftlcers being gener a lly r e duc e a to secondary roles in 
the clienteles of Ci vili an leaders , whether ot the government o r Or 
ita OPPosltl0n . ~26 This st atus was powerfully afrected, however , by 
the military defeat of 19~1 . Peruvian troop3 cr053ed the disputed 
border bet ~een the two countries. 5el~ing a large chunk o f territory 
and depriving Ecuador of e por t on the Amazon . The 111 ~ prepared 
Souadorean mi litary (luffered the hum ili at io n Of lOSing territory and 
Mving a treaty lmpo(led in the ?rotoool of Rio de Janeiro. It also 
felt betrayed by the oivl1i an government ' s .. 1 thholding of troops 
rro:D the front lines. Thus the convi ction was bred that the Armed 
Forces must look to their o wn institutional needs , Wh ich must be 
Isolated and protected from the wh ims or politicians. 
Du r ing the next t wo decades. a host of important corporat e 
benchmarks were reall~ed . An expanded educational syste~ was 
streS(led. with the ArlllY school joined by the Escuela Naval and the 
Escue!a Aerea. both located on the coast In Salinas . They were 
four-year programs for high school graduates . but the Coleglo 
Mllitar (War College) 11'1 Quito r equired rive years. with the 
equivalent or the last three years or high school beIng rollowed by 
" 
t .... o of strictly military cou r se work . After 1950 all office rs were 
requ ir ed to be pro ducts of thei r r especti ve serv i ce sch ool~ , whe re a 
tradition or soclall:u tlon emphasized the national , lIIoral, and 
professional responsibilities setting them apart frelll ordin ary 
ci tiz ens . Add i t iona l training bec a me avaIlable at the Academ ia de 
Cuer r a , a general statr sohool tor s eni or ot t lcers (It was closed 
bet lfeen 1952 and 1956 , howeve r , t ollowln8 an ou tburs t of 
In,,ubordlnat,lon against t he dettlocratlc gO'vernmen t or Gal a Plaza 
Lasso) . The more pr omising oftlcers were otten sent ab r oad tor 
advanced training , most freQuently to the United States , Brazil, or 
Argentina . Not until 1972 did Ecuador establiSh Its own advanced 
war college. 
Although educational expan"lon in the 1 9~Os and 1950s lert 
Ecuador with a milita ry that still l a gged behind IIIOst South American 
·)ountrl e :l In th i s r ega rd (01uch of the ed"lCat lon was , after all, at 
'~he secondary l eve l), overall progre:lS was unllen l a!)le. Huoh the 
s ame was true of t he militar y' s :llze and organi zat i onal st r uctu r e . 
By 1972 , on the eve Of a go lp e de e3tallO , mi l itary ma npower had 
reaChed some twenty thousand. Two-thi r ds belonged to the Ar:llY. with 
t he re:llainder diVided al:llo"t equally between the Navy and the Air 
Forc e. Military ser vice was required by the c onstitution! a nd the 
Ley de Servl clo Hil ita r defined the conscription period as one year . 
Thl:l requireme nt made the Eouadorean military relatively s mall by 
continen ta l 3tandards but stil l con:ltltuted an advance ov e r th e 
si t uati on i n 19 41. 
" 
Charge a with defending the Independence and Integrity ot t~e 
nat i on , the Ar med forces were also held responsible t or executing 
both constitutional and ordlr1a ry legislative rules . In a ssuming 
such du ties . they had recognized the need tor greater organiza tiOnal 
precision Ir'I the wak e of the 19111 defeat. Changes we r e gradually 
int r od uc ed , most no tably in the series or reforms intr-oduced In 
1956. These inno vati ons lIIerged with ea r lIer practices to produce 
the organizational and adml nlstr-ative conf igurat ion in place when 
the 1912 tr'lterventton toOk place . The pre'3ldent or the republic 
contin ued to be commar'lder' in chief or the military and respon:!lble 
tor National Security Article 116 of the Co nst i tut ion ot 191<5 . The 
chain ot command contlnued through the ml~iste~ of national defense 
to the joint command, wh lch at that tlone wa" composed of the th~ee 
service commande r s . 
,he mlnl"ter of defen$e was he ld responsible for realizing 
; resldentt,l poliCies and was u!:lually a civilian (only three 
eXceptions occur red betlo/een 19118 and 1972 , a lthoug h the patte~n 
later changed In the direction of r etired generals) . The mint!ter' s 
principal mi lit ary advisor, variously titled subsecretary or vlce~ 
~inlster at different tImes, was to be a senior actlve~duty officer . 
The highest positions withi n the military est ablishment were those 
Of the high comma nd (he r e too the labels have changed over the 
years) , wh ich consisted of the chief or the gene r al stafr and the 
three service commanders. The sen ior active- duty officer was 
expected un der mo:!t cl~cumstanc es to sorve as Chief or the general 
3taff I;)ut lac ked hierarchic a l a uthority over the Army, Navy , and Ai r 
Force commande~s. Although the detense ministry and the three 
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subdlreetor's o f the Arllled FOl"ces general s tatt wer e made responsible 
tor Claa r-dInet ton, In practice it ·.raa o rten mInim,,!. A5 will be 
nalec! subsequently, even durin@: the 1980:1 , \nter!:!ervlce rivalries 
and erratic commun Ica tion:;, have continued to wea ken the potential 
(or unified action. 
The co untry was divided geographically Into five r egio nal 
~ones. with Army headquart e rs In Quito, Guayaqui l. Cuenca, LOJa. end 
Machala. The first three :z:ones have customarily been commanded by 
generals. 80th Quito and Guayaqull have a number of "eparate 
In fantry , artillery, and armored units located stratesically nearby . 
To the :south in Cuenca end en virons are additional sOlatIer 
garrisons. Especially crucial to the entire ~one Is the £1 Oro 
dl~lslon of Loja, ~hich depl oys nearly half of the Army's troop~ 
alo ng or near the Peruv ia n borde r. Desplte its dlHanoe from the 
~apl tal, this outpost has sometimes asserted [!!ajor political 
t:'l rIuence In recerlt year s . Other centers of strength within the 
Ar~y ha~e Included the Academia de Gu erra and the Co1eglo Hl11tar In 
Q .. lto . By the 19103 and thereafter, the paratroope r school and the 
Instituto HIlitar de Geograr!a, also located In Quito, have 
sometimes acted wi th relative Independence in times of orisis, 
although they are nomi nally j ol neQ to the general Haft. 
The significance and I nf lue nce of the Na~y and the Air forc e 
have understandab l y been :leoondary unt i l recent year~. At 
politically delicate moments, thelr roles have orten been exercised 
only to the extent that an IndlvlQual service commander at the time 
might be a .st rong or deCisive personality . Neverthe less , 
Institutional tr<>ditlons we!'e slowly buIlding by the 19509 and 
'8 
af ter. For the Navy , its chief and the squadron cornman"e,.. in 
Cuayaquil have generally been the only officials likely to exe r cise 
political clout (again excepting the later experience with military 
gover nment). The tlavy covers t hree separate distriots that are 
responsible tor the coast, highl ands , an d the Am azon River and 
The Air forc e (which was founded by the Ar my in 1920 and 
declared a ",eparate br anc h in 19 44 ) has moved progretlslvely to .. ard 
overt competition with the Army. The bas e at Taura near Guayaquil 
has ordinarily been the home base for most of the oombat planes ; its 
comma nder 1.'1 frequently an impor tant o ffl cer , a5 are the ::Iacona zone 
commande r in Guayaqtlil an d the chief of the air transpo,.t base i n 
Qu ito. 
These e vents co nstituted th e important developments in the 
th r ee decades after the war with Peru. a l though a misleading 
inter l ude o f constituticnal government ~ uggested greate r pol itic a l 
institu tionali z at i on t han actually existed . Begi nni ng in 19i18 with 
Galo Plaza , however , three s ucces:li ve elected governments se r ved 
their full four-year te r ms and handed over the rei ns of pO~'er to 
leaders who had in fac t been st r ong critios. But when this chain 
was b rok e n in 1961 , the Armed Forces played a major ro le in 
t erm i nati ng the fo u r th pr es i dency of the inefrable Jose Mari a 
Velasco I ba rra. T'''O ye ar s lat er , the mil itary be cam e the decisi v e 
act or i n a still-controversial ous t er of Carlos Julio Arosernena 
Monroy, the former v ice p r esident who had rep l aced Ve1asco.27 
~s:;uming power on 1 1 July 1963, the Junta rep resen ted the first such 
institutional i nterven tion since 1925 . 
, I , ...... ______________________________________________________________________________________________ J
" 
Declaring it" Intention to exercise more than the customary 
role of temporary guardianship, the Jun~a pledged Itself to an "rray 
or r elormist objectives . According to the Army ' s Colonel Mar cos 
G~ndara Enr{quez, 
A long ge .. 18:1 of detects and errors obUged the Armed 
Forces to judge the na tIonal reality and. consequently . 
to assume not only the responsibility for ending the chaos 
and rectifying mistaken paths , but also the responsibility 
(or promot i ng a new soc i oeconomic 5tructure that .;ou1<:1 
permit t h e State to comply with its (unction of servi n g 
the common interests of its clttzgns , t hus laying the 
foundation (or a true demOCracy.2 
The junta retained power tor nearly three years, during which time 
it nallied with tech nocrats and adopted policies that were in vogue 
under the All1ance for Progr,us,~ whiCh implied a firmly 
anticommunist foreign policy and a "series or moderate reform l o ... s 
(lealing ... lth agrarian structure, taxation, and admin ls tration.,, 29 
!n the end, how,ver, the Junta'S beSt efforts were largely 
tr u:ltrated, and on 29 March 1966 , It threw up Its hands and qu!t--so 
abr uptl y that Ecuador actually experienced more than twenty - four 
hours withou t I government . 
f ol l owing two years of In t erim governrne nt , constitutiona l or(ler 
was restored when Velasco Ibarra was elected to his fifth term as 
.,resident . AlmOSt IlIImediately the tirelessly demaBoglc and 
indomitably personalistic ftGran Ausente" plunged into hiS usual 
administrative mistakes, s t ubbornly antagonizing the opposition 
while grievously aJlsmanaging the economy . By 1970 the A.r me d .orces 
( always handsomely treated during Velasqulsta Bovernments) remained 
virtually his only signifi ca nt source of support. On 22 June 1970, 
• 
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Velasco UlI&d military support to engIneer his so - call ed aulofjolpe, 
closing down Congress, dls~isslng th e courts . and assuming 
unchallenged power of decree power for himself. Th is occurrence "'as 
tar fr om the end of military ltwolvement In aff ecting the fate of 
the regime. 
A civilian minister of defe nse , the president's nephew Joq;e 
Acos~a Velasco , had been shrewd l y and assiduous ly manipulating 
pI"omotlons and assignments to U3ure contInu ing loyalty . Bu t when 
he sought to force the res ignat ion of t he direCtor of th e Army wa r 
academy , he provoked a crisis th a t led to his resignation and th a t 
of severa l ranking orrlcers . In l ate March of 1971 , Velasoo was 
cUnging to power without the atd. of a skillful minister , and the 
IIlllltary had been ange r ed and Its hierarchy disrupted. Furthermore, 
the new Army cOalmander wa ~ Co l one l Guillermo ROdr(g ",ez Lar a , who 
~eca",e the ma irl de f e nder of mili tary Independence and Institutional 
_~gltlmacy . As ? r es l den t Vela~co encoun t ere d escalating greater 
popul ar prote~ts and ciVilian opposition and continu ed to manhandle 
economic policy , prospects mounted for anoth er golpe . 
Analysis of the f orces and ractors that p layed a part In t h i s 
sequence of even t9 li es beyond the purview of t his s tUdy. a u t among 
t he more Importan t were wi desp r e ad f ears over the antiCipat ed 1972 
pre91 dentlal election o f the Lebanese populist f r om Guayaquil , Assad 
aucaratl) ; 30 the accumulat ed VelasQuls ta fallurell; and the advent of 
pet roleum wealth as a source that Might transform th e na t lon . 31 On 
15 Fe bruary 1972 . ov er Carni val we e kend, the military movet:! t o s e ize 
power. This time. t he l e a t:! e rs of Ecuador's mi litary brought with 
t hu even more pr ogramrllatlc views than In 1963. Although 
tendencies diverged " Hhln t MI", g r oup (a'" " I ll be seen), the ran King 
officers agre ed on their righ t, evan their duty, to a.'uum.e 
polic ymaking au t hor i ty. Within a mon th, this perspective "las made 
e xplicit In the I n1tl a l ~ l1oaor[a y pl a n de Acclon de l Cobler no 
Revoluclonar lo y Naclonali sta del Ecuador: 
The constant fa ilu r e", or governments, absence o r the 
peo;!l e in cente r s or decl ::llo n, ad m!nl::ltratlve immora l ity and 
Iner riciency . the incap aci ty and In::linearlty or po lit i cal 
parties and gr oups t o Interpret popul a r aspi r ations and the 
rundamental eco nomi c structure have determi ned the eXistence 
or an un j ust and backward SOCiety, with small oppre ssing groups 
and the majorit y oppr essad . 
FaCing this si t uat i on , the Armed Forces, r esponsible 
ror th e surviv al o f t he Ecuador ean Sta t e , having asaumed 
;~;1;;;":;lth l eade rs or c au d illos but as an Institut i on, is to Implant a new na tional that will t it to f" '"' 
At thi s point, Ecuador enter ed an era o r military aut ho ri tarianism 
dnd bourgeois statl::lm u nlike an y thing It had ex perienced before . 
POLICY: MILITARY CO VERNMEN T AND STATISM . 1972-1976 
From t he outse t, the self - styl ed Coblerno RllvoluclonarIo y 
tl aclo nalls ta de clared ita e l f In ravo r o r aoc ioeoonomic reforms 
broadly para lleling tho s e of the mi li tary regim e In PerC!. 
Describing Itself as committed to Henergetlc action agai nst socially 
and IIconomlcally pr iv il eged groups , " the new governm e nt described a 
sat or programmatic ",pac lf l cs on 29 December 1972 in th e Plan 
integ r al de t r anstorll!ac lon y desa rrollo . 19 73-1971 . It targeted 
three basic goals: national integra t ion , Improved lIving conditions , 
and g r oate r economic outpC!t through a more ra tional ua e of natural 
p~------------------
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resources. This agenda was to be funded by t he petroleum boom that 
was Just beglrH'llng. Dur ing the lIt9 or the Rodriguez: Lara 
gov e rnlTJent, constant comp e tit i on went on between prog .. ,sslve 
reformists and traditionalists (labels that are aQmittedly 
simplistic). While this disp ute was being played ou t, however , the 
Armed ,orees !loved decisively In the direc tion of a statism 
previousl y unknown In Ecuador. 
Reformists and Traditionalists 
As David SChodt has wr itten , the corne rs to ne or the Plan 
l rltegral >las decidedly state - led deve lopm ent. Ecuador required 
Hmore deCisive Irlterventlon by the State In the economy .•• to 
promote new reforms necessary to expand the potential fo r na t ional 
grow t h . The strategy 111lplles tr ansfer ri ng to the Public Sector 
~.ho se fundamental decisions that affect the economy and Ecuado r ean 
~oclety . those that today are made In foreign center~ ." 33 While 
prOlllises we re made to enhance t he private secto r, tile Plan and other 
official statements made clear the intended tranSferal of major 
economic declsion~ away from a nat ion a l bourg eoisie purportedly 
Incapable of prodUCing the desired mode r nltatlon . 
irolod1tlonal forces reacted f o r the IIIOst part wi th pre dictable 
apprehension, and these fears wer e height e ned when Gen era l Rodr{guet 
Lara rellloved s eve ral rightist officers fr om t he initial government 
t e am . This preoccupation wa s fur ther underscored by ofricia l verbal 
elllphasis on t he government's?) nationalist and revolutionary 
qualIty. Yet Ecuadorean leftists and avowed progres sives remained 
skeptioal from the very beglnr'1lng, Interpr e ting polley proposals as 
a modernizing desa rr o l li smo l ink ed part icul arly t o i ndustri al an<:l 
Im;>resarlal elites . As the noted Ec uado rean Jesuit Lui s E. Proatlo 
wrote two mont hs after the gol pe . t he otriclal pr ogram or action was 
not revolutionary but tended ins t e ad ~to be reformist , wi t h its 
charac te ristiCS being t hose or efficiency, administrativ e hone s ty , 
and bureaucratic techn i ficat ion.n3~ 
In t he mo nths that fo ll owed , Rod r{gue ~ Lara . a moderate 
n&tionall:)t, wav e red !:letween the reformist ana tra<lltional l st 
eleDlents . With th e sen i o r l e adershi p dlv i<led and Incapab l e of 
\lnitlng !:lehind a si ng l e vision, Rodr!gue~ Lar a coul d only shir t 
opportunistical l y "I th the win<ls o f the moment. But <lespite dl.scord 
over the polley perspective , procedural matters and government 
declslon -Dlaklng arous ed Ie,s controver,y. In tact , tew <llspute<l the 
ArDled For ces ' belLef in "hi erarchy , d iscL pllne . subordination . and 
~ u t ual respec t, which ... contr ib ute <lec i,ivel y to . 
~J reventing the dest ruction of the human species . !'Ille r estorin8 
Internal an<:l internationa l ord er " The mi litary also assu~e<l 
re"ponsibility tor reinstituting national mori!llity. ROdriguez l.ara 
declar e <l in a t ypical statement in October 1973 that for Ecuador , 
Rthe vital el ements or the equIllbrLuDl at the lives ot t he people 
an<l theIr aptltu<le t or pro8ress lie in restoring an Invulneratll e 
<llsclpL1 nary conscience In the ccunt ry." 35 
The military 80 ve r nment also as,ume<l broa<l s Qcle tai 
resp onsl blll tle" , mov i ng int o banking, baste Industries, ta:-::es , 
agr ic ult ure , fl3hin8, ceme nt , and . of course , petroleulD. Duri ng t he 
seven years a tt e r the military govern ment se ized powe r, ~heth'r 
dominated by retormist o r t radit ional ist oftlcial" the r e81 me 
p 
cr eated more th an a dozen new public ent e rprise s . Its me t hodll 
included nationlll1z1ng exlstlns businesses . as with t he Ecuatorlal'la 
alrU ne . and crf!(iting new enterpr!"es like the petroleum 
corpor ation , the Corporaclon Estata l Petrol e ra Ecuato rlana (CEP E) . 
Value added by publi c enterprises as a shar e or gro'ls domestic 
product rose substantially, coming pr imarily trom petr oleum, 
t r ansport , commun ications , and publi c ut i lit i es. Public rlnancl al 
Ins titutions wer e s tr e ngthened an d served as a channe l t or s tate 
lnvest~ent. The Co r poraclon Flnanciere Naclonal alone, a major 
public inStitution by 1 9 7~ , hel d shares In mo"", than t wo dozen 
(11':05.36 In 1973 the Armed Forces created the Dir-eccl6n de 
Industrlas , whose management tell ma inly to the Army. A" one 
spoke sman sald , It was ~ the duty of the Ar<Ded .or ces to contribute 
to the SOCioe conomic de ve lopm en t of the co un try, creati ng organisms 
~hat wi ll promote , or ganize , and admlnl"ter basic Industri~s 
through o wned enterprises o r association with the pri vate 
~ector . "37 
Two ma jo r e xamples o t mlUtary statism also highlight the 
struggle over baSIC policy, exemplifyi ng the gradual ret reat or th e 
reform ists i n the race of s tr ong societa l pres~ure s favoring mo re 
tr aditiona lis ti c per s pectives. The areas Involv e d were agr Ic ulture 
and petroleum . Regarding agri cul ture , the ?lan Integral was to 
erad icate rural poverty and increase prod uctivity. It sought ~iiln 
iOl IIH!diate redistribution o f income in ravor of the large peasant 
population ... (tha t] will lead to c r eating a broad internal 
!:\ark et .... The agrarian structural chang e wil l thus be 
tr an srormed into a basic motor capabl e of e xpand i ng the pr oduc tive 
process and 'lnerglz.lng the natio nal economy. "38 Proposed re t o rms 
wert prepared early In the Rodr{gue~ Lara period, and Its 
resemblance to the Peruvian version l~medlately produced cries ot 
outrage trom large landc wne rs. 
,hiS outcry led to a mU Ch gentler document , whi ch was Issued In 
October as the Ley de Rerorma Agrarla ot 1973. It clid no t represen t 
a ~Ignlflcant departur e from earlier leg i.'31a tion In mo:!t regards, 
tailing far :!hort ot Its oftlclal selt·descriptlon as a Kstrategic 
instrument tor transtormlng the present economic and sooial 
scruoture ot' agriculture Into the tundamental base tor the 
development of Eouador. ft )9 Minister or Agriculture Guillermo 
MaldonadO Li nce, a nationalistiC spokesman for S'leeping action, "las 
soon caught up in the '/orte>; of the storm. Condition:! were 
aggravated by government a t tacks on landowners for alLegedly 
r~ducing production as a form of protest . Orricial", trie d to arsue 
-'lat the oI0vermllent was not really in the process or altering the 
ll1z.e of exis ting Individual holdings, bu t t hey were unsuccessful In 
quelling the orles ot outrage. 
,radltional landowner.'3 displayed an al~o8t paranoid fear that 
modernizing agribUSiness mlsh t b~ enc ouraged so much that Ie would 
overwhelm Its more orthodo>; oomp ,et ltion. They feared that masalvely 
financed agricultural in terests , aided and abetted by government 
support of cooperatives , would break their historlo dom inIon over 
rural areas whIle endangerIng the long·standlng marriage or 
convenienoe bet we en traditional landowners and e>;portlng int e res ts. 
If theae worries were not enough , report s also surfaced that alleged 
leftIsts In t he Insti t uto O:ouatorlano de Reforma Agrarla y 
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Colonl~aclon ( IERAe l planned to incite the pea,ants toward l and 
lIe!z;ures and othe r Illegal act,s. ily Mar ch of 19 7~ . the coa s tal anc! 
highland cha,2lbers of a gricu l ture proolaiauld Mi nister Ma l donado Lince 
"persona non grata " and a " traitor Influenced by foreign Ideologie s 
ell en to the national r evolu tionary government.,,40 
Th e military governmtlnt a ngroll), r etaliated by cancelIng aid to 
the gr'owers ' allsoc!iltlon and even Jail ed the president o f the 
Cuay aqull Chamb er of Agriculture b.-Iefly. Nev ertheless , the 
opposItion soon succeeded 1:'1 getting Maldonado LInce removed. His 
reSignation led to the naming of Colonel Raul Cabrera , the f Ourth 
he ad or the embattled ministry in less than t \olO year s . it also 
sy mi::>ol l:z:e d fllr the r officia l retreat from its i n i tial r eformist 
nationa lism. Ha l donado Lince wa" "oon Joined in the ranks of former 
top off iC ials by IERAC Dire c tor Marco Herrer" Escalante . Hi s force<1 
r eSi gna tion , ho· .. eve r . d i d not pa ss witho ut an angry re"ponse ( .-om 
~ errera : 
In this country . the Oligarchy is a lion that impedes 
transformations and development, one against whom it i s 
necessary to launCh a ha.-d strugg le to introduce changes 
.-ega rding agra.-Ian .-et orm . I beL1 e ve that 1 hav e committed 
a g.-ave error in having touched the ears Ind the t ail o( 
thiS animal. , . , Those who oome af t e r us should mount a 
frontal Ittack 1r they want t o defeat the lion,Ul 
In the final analysis, the Agra ri an Reform of 197 3 aohieved 
onl y a lilllited impa ct . as many had pred icted . Total land 
redistribu t ion fell far short of s pecified targets , an d rural 
pove.-t y continue d una ll'!v i ated. Accor ding to one p'-O!lllnent 
Ecu adorea n commentator, the la w failed In praotiCe as both an 
economic and I social doc ument . Benjamin Or tlt commen ted tha t 
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widespread feudalts~ could be con front ed wtth either a 11boral or a 
socialist approach, but ~The Ecu adorean law and its rulings have 
been neither of these, They mere ly reject the noti o n cf a t rue 
agrarian re rorm,w~ 2 Fo r General Rodr[guez Lanl , the e xperience with 
agricul tur al poli cy amply test i fIed to the const a nt opposItion of 
oligarchical sectors whenev er t rue reformism was broached . In the 
case or pet r oleum policy , even gr eater economic stakas were being 
contes ted by r ef orm i st and trad i tionalist for ce • . Here aga in, th e 
oarly impetus from nationalistic pr ogressives was gradually 
undermI ned by tr ad itional a ttit udes and orthodoxy both inside and 
outsi de the gover nment. 
The complexIt ies of the nascent national Industry and the 
signi f icance or the petroleum boom were pro found , and the array of 
disputatious domestic and i nterna t ional lnterest:l · ... ere s t rik i. .... g, 
"Qaking !:!ucclnct syntheSIS d1tricul t at best. li 3 The Plan de Acc lon 
origi nally pro rn i:;ed a ce ntral ro le for the state , wit h 
responsibility f o r setttng and implementi ng policy soon delegated t o 
the new state-operated Co rporacion Estatal Petrol era Ecuator iana 
(CEP E). Its dut I es inc lud ed 
. . . e:ltabllshLng pr ograms ror e xp lora ti on, ... inten:l1vely 
~ xplor lng resour oes in o rder t o s us tain a~ adequa te bala~ce 
be t '~e en res er ves a nd p rodu c t lo~, bUi lding state r e ftnerie~ to 
meet domestiC petro l eum needs, ... ~tudying market:! tor 
Ecuadorean cr ude pet r ole um, and establlshi~g a syste~ of 
auditing inves tmen ts by r ore ign oompanies In Ecuador . 1I11 
It was f urt he r sta t ed that " Petrole um polley wil l be based on the 
inalienable Interests o r the state, ra tional e xplO i tatIon, [and] the 
maintenance o f re serves for fut ure generations , wit hou t fo rgetting 
the j ust inoome rrom inve ~tment s of the petroleum companle s .ft4 5 
ze 
Tht early na tionalistic pe r iod transpired under the aegis ot' 
Navy Captain Gustave Jarrln Ampudla, who had originally been 
.ppointed to head the education 1II1nlst,.y un t il a dispute bet ween the 
Ar lllY and the Navy over other top pOsitions led to a shuftle of 
personnel . A (orlller commander ot the Naval Academy 8:ld an avowed 
natIonalist , Jarrfn soon demonstrated hie po licy convictions whil e 
assembling a qualified team at' Ecuadortans and foreigners. This 
team a chieve d an i mpress iv e ar ray of accomplishme ntll, allIong them 
retroactive application of 1971 pet r oleum regu lations , creation of 
CEPE , lIIembershlp In OPEC in November 1973. purchase of 25 percent of 
the shares in the Texaco - Gulf consortium , collaboratIon In rounding 
of the Organizaclon Latinoamaricana de Ene rgl a (OLADE) , const r uc ti on 
of the Esmeraldas rerlnery, and e~ploltatlon and management of the 
natlon'~ fir~t wells In the Oriente fielda . 
In pursuing these objeotives, Jar rfn and the reformists 
~~pportlng his Initiati ves fcllowed a t ough natlonall~tlc line 
toward petroleum multinatiOnals. Recognizing the need to prOCeed 
While the bargain ing l e ver age r ested wi th Ecuador--and also 
sensitive to the benefits of oonser vationlst measure s OYer the long 
haul --M inister Jarrfn and his oorapanlons best per90nlfled t he 
progressive element In the mili t ary. General ?:odrfguez Lara was 
scarcely unhappy with t h e achievement,. gained, an d even 
traditionalistic crltic~ could do little mo r e than grumble 
ung raciously in the race of ea rning s that Increa~ i ngly financed both 
devel opmen tal growth and greate r Institutional benefits ror the 
Armed Force~. Symbolic pre~tlge was also gained IIhen Ecuador host ed 
the OPEC meeting in Quito in June 197~ , Where Gusta vo Jar r{n 
(recently elevated to Rellr Adaliral) wa s electee pre'lli<lent of the 
cartel. 
" 
This point effectively marked the apogee ot bot h Jarr!n and the 
retor mi'llt thru~t ot petroleum policy un<ler military rule . Late in 
1 97~ , a combination of inte rnational and domestiC f orces caused hi~ 
realoval . Playing a part In thiS camp.lIlan were the growing 
international surplus at petro leu m played a part and quiet pr essure 
tro1!l the United States . Compromises with the multinationals were 
$Ollght , prOviSion:! tor royalty pay men ts \ier e modified , a nd petroleum 
pol ley was :lubstantlally moderated in a host or other waY:l. The 
mini:ltera at natural resources who follo wed Jarr[n --all at them 
s enior military or ricers--varied somewhat in their policy 
prefe r ence.s but basically hewed to a derensively cautiou'll and 
unaggress\vely orthodo x approaCh. 
As the wi~hdrawal from retormism gradually gained momentu~ in 
111 :l)ajor po li cy a rea'll. th i'll trend did not iraply any sort ening o f 
military adherence to 'IItatl'11m. WIth the aClvent o f petroleum 
earni ng 'll , the E:cuadorean sta t e tor the fi rs t ti me in its history 
posses'lleCl enough resou r ces of Its own to exercise developmental 
optio ns free of t he usual dependence on the whim and will at the 
private sector . By 10Iay of illustration, the total value ot expor t'll 
in 1971 wa s $2~2.9 million ; a year later, petroleum earnings had 
rai'lled the figure to $3 26.3 mill io n . al though the pipeline only 
opened in August. By 197~ e xport'll r eached $1 . 123 billion , wi th 'IIo",e 
l692 . 8 milli on of comi ng tram petroleum. Thts drama t ic exp a nsion 
nOl,lrlshed an accolllpanying boolD In the state budget : bet 10leen 1971 
and 197~ , it gr ew by 178 . 6 percent , f rom ~ . 103 mllit on suc r es to 
'1.~28 mlll1on.~6 
Government e~ pan91on Included the founding o f several new 
entities : the 1973 founding of the Sup erlnte ndencla de i'reolos to 
help administer price controls; the Empresa rlaelonlll de Productor 
Vitale" ( ENPROVIT) for the domelltlo h andl i ng an d dis t rll;lut l on of 
foodstuffs: and the establiShment of CEPE as well . St ate 
partlolpat i on 1n mixed enterp r ises wa.., 11190 e noour a ged , and the 
regime sometimes disregarded hostility f r om the pri vate sector. 
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whlch wa s eX8cI!rbated by the Increas ing shift o f econOmic pow"r from 
Guayaquil to Quito. All these Changes neve r theless ocourred when 
the A.rmed Forces were lacking programmatic unity on Issues ot her 
than national 1"... ror I nsta nce, even the ea r ly reformist period 
prO!se nted 1/1 sorne;./hat Inconsistent picture. Barely two mon t h" arter 
the sei z ure Of po"er , t he ministers o f government and prOduct i on , 
.,ho had both been rollowing the Peruanlsta tradition, were forced 
',ut of the government ju~t lihen orf l clal rhetoric became most 
radical . On the other sidll , in January 1973 the leader of the hard -
liners , Defense Mln1.,ter Gener al Vfctor Aule :l tia Mier , lias sUllllllarlly 
fired . 
The statis t thrust of government , anathema to the private 
sec t or , was in consider ab l e par t a pragmat i c r esponse designed to 
deal with problems susceptibl e to petroleum-financed government 
intervent i on . As Danilo Carrera Of t he Banc o Cent ral to l d 
Interv\eliers e arly In the ROdriguez La r a perlod . the r egime was not 
dedlcll.ted to a Pll.rtlc ul a r ideology and would underta ke public 
Intervention only when It seeme d neces!.lary . Nonetheless . the state 
did ent e r areas traditiona lly regarded by the private sector as 
" 
~rivileged terra in: ~the dominant eco nomic groups did not hesitate 
to adopt a pod tion that det'ieo the 8()tions," f requently resulting 
in nothing less than "an open challenge to t he authority or public 
power . "41 This challenge was rt r .st manltestea tor all t o see In 
Sept ember 1975 and ca Ol Il to fruiti on tour months late r. 
Institutional Or thodo xy and Co nsolidation 
It woulll be fair to conclude, in the .... ords or DaVid Schodt, 
that "although the 1972 military g ove rnment expanded t h e e conomic 
functlol'l& of th e Eo u8do r ean sta te beyond that accomplishe d by any 
previous gove r nmen t , its achIevement s in the a r ea or social r eforms 
were limited . particularly in view or the genera lly propltiou~ 
conditions I",,' roundlng the Installatio n of t his gover-rlment.·,IIB 
Fur- ther-.llor-e , ne ith e r- the unchar- Ismatlc Gener-al Rodr- [guez Lar a no r 
t he Ar-mOd Fo r-ces In general had sought or a chieved substant i al 
~upport . They had built up ne ither political movements nor personal 
popular-lty a nd achieved only limi ted success In r eaC hing out to 
... orkers and peasan t ~ f or broad-bas e d s upport. The mi ddle sectcr s 
and impresarial nationalists ... ere more inolined t o e n joy the 
benefl tll of prosperity than to f ight In the tr defenlle . By early 
1975 , the "nationalistic revolutionary" government had bil er! 
converted int o little more than an a dministr ator over thil Interna l 
factionalism of the Armed Forc e ll . 
As one Ecuadorean observer astutely noted, ROdrI guez I.ara ... a s 
increasi ng ly fac ed Il lth the rleed to choose betllee rl alterMtlve", 
either radicali zing th e polley proc ess ... hlle o r ganlzi rlg popula r and 
,",o rklng-class support o r casting aside all Mtlonalistlc 
pretensio ns . His r eluctance to choose one course or the other 
e ffectively hastened the end of his rule.~9 A series or tax, 
" 
impor t , and exchange measu,.,s taken 1n August of 1915 produced great 
hostilit y . The nationali stic technocracy of the mi litary government 
fo und its e lf deserted by the previously suppor t ive industrial 
bourgeoisie , while tradi tio nal soc i oeconomic e l ites conclud ed tha t a 
return to civilian ruh was necessary. Thus a conjunotion of 
inter-eets bet we en much of the private sector and the ambitions of 
more authoritar ian military orficers led to political c r 1818 and 
rumbles of a ne w golpe . 
Tensions beca;lll! public on 31 August 1975, 'oI'hen troops COtl'lInarHle Ci 
by General Rau l Gonzalez Alvear, chief of ~tarf of the ~r~eQ Force~, 
attacked and :lelzed the presid e nt lsi palace. But altho",gh the 
minister Of defense and the Army chief of staff were both captured , 
the uprising was otherwi:le botChed . ROddguez Lara was away from 
t he palace , not e ven In Quito, and key garrisons in the capital city 
remained loya l to the president. The All' Force ignored Gonz'lez 
Alvear's orders to overfly key un its with combat planes , and the 
lack of popular ~upport for the lns urgent~ was notab le . In the 
arterluth of the uprising, Gonz'lez ,Uveal' and other~ believed to 
want a lasting military government under avowedly r ighti st 
authoritarianism were purged. Those d1.slIlissed includ ed the 
minIsters of finance and natur al re sourc e s , 
" new se t of financi al and monetary decrees were issued , but by 
this pOint, the fate of the Roddguez La ra government had been 
sealed. Ri sing constitutionall~t se ntiment in the Arllled <orces , 
encourag ed by major economic groups, sought a return to ciVilIan 
normality and t he rule or law . Th i s 3urse wa3 i nevi tably combined 
with a dat ermi natio n to eschew the mor e prosre3s! ',e poliCi es or the 
past. At the sagle time, the f irst strike by the three national 
f ede rations co lla borating with one another took place in NOVember, 
further aSitat ing domes t ic politics . Even the ultraconservative 
arch~ishop of Guayaquil demanded a res torati on of ~ the t ull e~ercise 
ot cur l1~ertil!8 ," whil e the pre.:!:! squirmed under heighte ned 
otrictal censorship . The denouement came on 9 January 1916. The 
schedu led wed d ing or ROdr(guez La r a ' s daugh.ter I n t he presidential 
plll"c e was allowed to tak e pl a oe , but a f t erward he was hus t led a .... ay , 
and a three · man ConseJo Supremo de Gobi e rno ass umed power . 
The ConseJo ' s membership Included t he Army commander, General 
Guill ermo Dura n Arcental,s , who had previously se rved IlS mIni ster ot 
bo t h education and gove r nment and was viewed as a hard ~ line 
t raditIonalist . Hany had advocated that he replace Rodriguez Lara . 
but enough opposition em erge(J to require a compromise. Crucial to 
suCh an adjust me nt was Vice Admlrel Alrredo Poveda a urbano . chelr o r 
the joint Chiefs or Btaf r llinee tne Sept e mber uprising an(J another 
rorlller II!lnlllter ot government. lie "'as regarded as tle~lble In 
outl cok a nd s taunc hly ded icated to re storing civilian gove rnment (a 
quest i onable issue with Duran ) , a senior Navy oftic l al "'ho 
represented the most progres.'3ive br anch ot the servioes at that 
time . Once the compromis e bes e n t o take shape, It became logical tc 
round out the Con:'lejo with Air force Commander LuiS Leoro fren co . a 
newl y promote(J gene ral who was much younger than his t wo 
cOl.lnterpart s . 
" 
Rodrfguez Lara was a l lowed to i"sue a tlnal resignation 
mes'age, and he produced a tlnal nationalistic document denouncing 
the enelllies of the public all well a" nationa l Imperialism. 
Afte r ward , the Con,eJo S up remo de Goblerno moved to assert Its own 
Identify. It callie to power under circumstances In which the 
Industrial bourgeOisie had little to loae In oPP051ng the Rodrfguez 
Lara governm ent. The willingness of the military from 1912 on"ar d 
to subsldi2,e ex pansion ot the prl'ate sector had never been In 
doubt . and it was Logical for structural reasons that even the 
reoeding vestiges ot military reformism were under sharp attack. 
the rule Of t he Tril,l[llvirate gradually unfolded , much or its time and 
attention was devoted to forlllulating and l~plelllent1ng ~ethodS t o 
negotiate the Ar!'lled forces' withdrawal rro~ power. This phase was 
also marked by sporadic exer ti ons by less tra dit l onali~ t iC cftlcia13 
t:> ,park new r~torms, (or even RodrIguez I.,.ara's rellloval and the 
forced reUre~ent ot some of his :naln mIlitary and ci v ilian al::!!!S 
did not automatIcally end the factionalis m. 
The r e lative balance within the government that existed Detween 
Generel Duran and Admiral Poveda was circumscribed no t Only Dy the 
g r eater ope nness a nd fle XIbility of the la tter but by the wld ely-
held suspicion that Duran did not truly support lII11itary withdrawal 
from power, whereas PO'leda seemed Inclined to do so . The new 
government wa~ not tota lly bereft of nationa listic flg\.lreS; thr ee of 
I t s key figure!:! d\.lrlng the early months were Colonels Rene Vargas 
?azzos, Rlchelleu I.,.evoyer . and Oliverio Vasconez. Vargas, 
ch ief of CEP E until transferred t o command t he influential El Oro 
Infant r y brigade In November 1975 . became the new minister of 
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natur a l r esour ces . His first official aeclaratlo n advocated higher 
royalties and the possib le purchase Of an additional 26 percent of 
Texaco~Culf shares. 
Whil e faillng sho rt of demanding ou t ri ght nat i ona lization , he 
continued t o espouse flr~ly independent policies While mobilizing 
publlo support from none other than retired Custavo Jarr!n and 
for:ner members of his team. '/argas ' s role became cent ral to 
Ecuador's resisting the constant pressures and threats of Culf 011 , 
which finally pulled out of Ecuador . Vargas's basiC orientation was 
paralleled on a quiete r (and ul t ima tely less successful) level in 
the ministry of agricult ure by Vasconez . who had earlier se rv ed as 
agricultur e undersecretary to the 111~fated Mini ster Ma ldonado 
Lince . The third nationalist, Rlche l1 eu Levoyer, wa s an 
acknOl(ledged reformis t who wa:! first given authority to reopen a 
~ialogue I(lth cl"Ulan groups and chart a course tOl(ard restoring 
>,onstHutlOrlal rule. But within a fel( Clonths , he was reassigned , 
a nd the r e formi s t barlner :'! l a rge l y f e ll to Vargall, who r emalrled In 
orflce until february 1977 , when he waa replaced by a more 
cO:lllervatlve Office r, Army Ceneral Eduardo Semblantes Polanco. 
Al most from the outset of the Tr iumv irate, howe ver, mOllt 
econoa lc policy r e flected a r evival Of t r aditional orthodox y 4~ now 
maintained by a state far larger and more powerful ~han ever before. 
Str ict a <Jsterity mea~<Jres Ifere decreed as a rorm or Heconomic 
purlflcatLorl"; the Jun t a Monetaria toughened Its import controls ; 
and current spending ... a s curbed . In due course, a conflict I(ith 
powerful, but ~canaa l ~rldd en , bank consortia rrcm C<Jayaqull caused 
to ministerial shifts , which produced a new min i ster of f inance who 
t 
swiftly stepped up Inter nationa l borrowing . Santiago Sevilla 
Larrea , a r eputed "boy wonde r " or thlrtY~3even , 500n devised an 
eJt?an~ i onlst polley. This direction was wel1·recelved by the 
COM ejo Sl,Ipremo de Gobler-no, especially 1:'1 1978 and 1979, when 1t 
lias seeking to buy popularity on the brink of leaving power. 
During the first si x mOnths of 1917 , foreign loans were 
contracted tor' 501019 four hundred million do ll ars. Sev i lla told 
Inter -deWar" that his responsibility was to finance the government'S 
devdop"l ental projects. A.s a former minister of f inance aptly 
commented : 
It: seellls t hat the milit a ry governme nt. having p l e<lged a 
return to oons t l tutlonal government, wou l d like to capit a lize 
on the remaining months or I t s administration to carry out as 
many projects as possible. To do so natl.lrally requires 
",peMing a large a mount of money that, baing I.Inavallable 
throl.lgh ordinarr sources of inoome, ml.lst be obtai ned thrOl.lgh 
foreign credlt.?O 
,roOl the beginning of 1976 I.Intll it left power, the Consejo Supremo 
de Goblerno produced an expansio n I n the public e Kternal debt of 
more than 50 percent per year . It alao ctecreed in January 1979 a 
one-third incr ease In the nation ' s Olinlmurn wage whil e adding another 
eK~ra month'S bonus paytllent to the aalary or publlc-aector 
work ers. 51 All these measures were a ccompa nied by a prOgressive 
retreat r r om eyen the rhetorical nationali sm of the Rodrfguaz Lar3 
years. 
The TriumVira t e ' s Increasing neect for greater Income , which 
gradually became It~ major prior ity , stimulated a new series of 
foreign loans dat ing from May 1977 . Sevilla , the architect of the 
economic polic y, .... as toppled by a scandal over contracts and alleged 
- - --
influence-peddling, and in October 1918, hi~ replacement declared 
that the petroleum boom had ended. Amid wide"pread consternation 
and anger , he contended that more borro !o' ing and added domestic tax 
revenue would be nece~sary to ~ustain infrastructural developmant 
and ongoing governDlent p,-oJects. It would have been far more 
accura te to speak of a rece""ion 1n p.-fces and wo.-1d demand, but 
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that is not the point , Rather, tills pe.-spectiv e further bespoke tlla 
orthodo xy of ranking ofrtcers once the Triumvir a te had SOl1 d1tLed 
it~ con trol and charted the path toward constttutional restau.-aci6n , 
as it was commonly called . 
In withdra wing from the .-eformist impulses that had spurred 
poUcy initiatives erratically during the RodrIgue: Lara years , the 
Consajo Supremo de GObier no abandoned red ist.-\ butive policies , 
turned a!o'ay f.-om soci al pro blems wi t-h dlsinte.-est, all(! r urthered Lts 
~wn Institutional interests . At the same time, the Armed ,orces 
~ h~m~el"es we r e less than 0I0nol1th1c , mirrorine: the hegemon ic 
instability of Eeuadorean sooiety, As two students of the military 
ha'Ie expres"ed the tIlateer : 
The dive.-se modalities of social forces eds t i ng on the 
polit i cal battlefield !o'ere approximated , , . by the t enlllon!! , 
contradi c tlons , and struggles within the Artaed Fo.-ces ... , 
The struggle among dominant or s ubordinate social forcell 
exte nded the ir battlefield t o the barracks ..• , This 
situatI on determined that the hegemoniC crisis was t.-anllre.-.-ed 
to the inter ior ot the ArOled For ces, und e .- the dual Corm of a 
tailitary aecular Incap acity to itaplement a determined hegenlony 
and a p.-ogre~' Ive i deologioal and doc t.- inal fragmentation. 52 
It had , perhaps inevitably , proven [mpO"Sibl , t o meet even the 
demands of econOllllc elites alone. For instance , attempts t o court 
t he nation ' !! indust.-iali~ ts i ncluded a "hlft of poliCy toward 
foretgn lnve~tment and export mark ets . In 197 6 the new Industrial 
Development Law set forth i nce nt ives , but its results we r e mo dest . 
Coastal 1ndustrlalists wanted t o favor processed agri cul t ura l 
e xports , wh ile sierra Industr i ali s ts cemanded stimulati on Of the 
manUfao tur e d goods indu stry. 53 Simila r oiro umstance s were 
pre vaili ng i n other sectors as well. As a parti cular result of the 
tariler boom j' ea rs that nour ished t he E:cuadorean elites "11th 
generous infusions of petrole um earnlMls , they became llIore 
fragmented and fractiOus than ever, The fina l l ega cy of the 
TriumVirate In socioeconomic pollcy was a Sit ua tion of stagnation, 
highly unev en growth, mounting t ore i gn de bt, shrinking petroleum 
reserves without further eXploration , and popular discontent ever 
unrealized e~pecta t ions dating back to 1972 and the beginning of 
military rule , 
?OL!TICS , TilE: AR I'.E D FORCES AN D SOCIETY , 1976 - 1988 
It I,. a tru1slll that the 1I1 ll tary establishment , a3 a separa t e 
for ce In SOCiety , cannot hol d Itae lf aloof f rom o ther s e cto r s even 
whe:'l It Is not a ttempting to rule the natIon . One of the basic 
leaaons to elllerge from th e ,period be tween 1972 and 197 9 was the 
extent to wh ich the Arm ed forces lO e r e Influenced in polley choice~ 
by t he ex ternal preference::! and presll ures in which t hey ... e r e 
enmeshed . When a conjunctur e o r r o r c es and circumlltan ces l e d t he 
1II11ltary towa r d a re t urn to the barracks, milita r y reactions were 
s lg nirtcant in a t least t wo ways. The f irst r eaction of interest 
wa s the eftort to protect its accumul ate d corporate Interests by 
pl ay ing a deCisi ve r ol e in choosing a new president; second wea the 
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dete~minatlon t o consolidate ru ~ther its grow ing p~oresslonalism 
wh il e seeki ng ye t g rea te r moderni1:3tlon . These se lf - imposed duties 
were ro~e~ost In the mlnds or both pollcy ~,.,rorme rs and 
t~adltionalls ts in planning the return to constitutional government. 
The Pa~tles a nd Mili tary Inte~ests 
The th~ee-yea~ process wh e~eby the Armed Forces neg ot iated t he 
~eest abllshment or ci Vilian g ove~nment was slow and to~tuous-­
exoes sivel y so. The acoompanying r1gu~ e s umm a rizes a brier 
chronology of events du~lng t h Is perlod.54 Throughout thi ~ty- ni~e 
mon th3, constant spe culatio n churned o ve~ the Intentions and 
si ncerity of the A.rmed Forces , poss i b le d i vis ions within the 
Triumvir ate . and a host o r rela ted qu estIons . Pred ictabl y, the 
mili tary lead ers hip was di Vided . Th e t rue hard -l iner s hoped to 
ex tend the process l.'1de f lnltely while pu tting their o wn leade r s In 
;Jlace . Ely all irl(l1cati ons, Cene ral Du r a n be lie ve d In th is taotlc a~ 
well 33 I n hi s o wn credent i als to become unchalleng ed chi e f or 
s t a t e . Other orrtce r s '1e r e willi ng t o l e av e power, b ll t only aft er 
establIshing a s e t of oond lt ions provi ding Ironclad guarant ees ror 
military cor pora te i nter es t s . Ye t a third current or thought held 
that military d epartl,l re should be re latively s wIft and 
unconditional . 
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new cOnstitution 
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Re ferendum he ld : new constItution approved 
ConseJo Supremo de Gobierno Issues own electoral 
regulations , barrIng candidacy of IIs'IIad Sucaram 
and all former pres i dents 
Consejo Supremo de Gob l erno dIrects Tribunal Supremo 
Electoral to elimInate selected parti e " and 
candidates 
Jaime Roldos and Concentracion de Fuer~a::l Populares 
wIn flr'llt rou nd Of electIons 
RegIme see ks to a lter re'llults; Tribunal Supre~o 
Electoral delays count; conservati'tes demand 
annulment Of pr oces'll 
Tribunal Superior Elec t oral replaced; vote-counting 
renewed ; run-off election'll promI se d for April 79 
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The laSt group was the lea'll t infl u ential , as ev e nts were to 
prove . Over the long run, however, and despite the issue be ing In 
doubt for roore than three year'll, th e coromltment to withdraw 
gradually became do .. inant . Thl!l pO'llltion was quietly but fir!llly 
baCked by AdmIral Poveda. A.ccompanyIng this tren d Ifas an 
inereaslngly unqulllified determination that the proees'll could not 
ope .. ata r .. ee!y but demanded ca .. erul guidance and cont .. ol by the 
Armed fo .. ces. ConseCjuently, both ha .. d-l ine .. s and rIIoCe .. ate! ·~ e r e 
able to Join in erro .. t s to e xe " Cis e veto powe .. ov e .. unde~irable 
candidates , pa .. tles, and coalitions . Su t by t he tl lll e t he p .. ocess 
finally ended, the A .. med fo .. c e s had misju dged public ",entilllent , been 
outlllaneuve"ed by civilian fo .. ces, and been to .. ced to accept a n 
outcome that they round hlghi y cls t a!:ltetui . 
Given the limits ot space , a fe w lIords abou t candidac i es mU!:lt 
Suffice . De!:lpite almos t incessant lIIeddl1ng and g .. atuitous insults 
t o public opinion, the ml1ita"y's succession ot a .. blt .. a .. y acticns 
we .. e ulti.mately trus t .. ated . FL .. st , the Consejo Supremo de Goblerno 
"eruaed to apply new electo .. a l and pa .. ty .. egulatlons to the 
ro .. thcoming process, a deois i on that enabled them to Issue thei .. own 
dispositions. The still-tea .. ed and ml!:lt"usted Assad Buca .. am or the 
r:cnce nuaclon de fuerz:as Populares (CfP) ha d to be excluded r"olll t h e 
.. .. esldeney. .l.n ext .. ao .. ,Hna .. y exe .. clse in wa .. ped logic b a .... ed ft"st 
his candi dacy because his pa .. ents we .. e (o" elgn-bo"n; late .. he waa 
p .. ohlblted t .. Oal .. unnlng to .. mayo .. ot Guayaquil, then to .. vice-mayor . 
finally even hI", wife was banned ( .. om .. unning to .. mayo .. on the 
g .. oundS that she lack ed a high school diploma t .. om an acc .. edlted 
institution. 
Fu .. the .. gove .. nment Inte r ve ntIons Included the p " ohibi t ion on 
all fo .. me .. preSidents r .. om .. e.s umLng the p .. eslde ncy. This category 
included sOllie half do~en at t he time , sev e .. al ot whom we .. e 
eontemplatlng anothe .... aee . There was eve n tea .. ot a .. etu .. n GY 
elghty - fou"-y e a .. _old Jose Mada '/e13seo , who had already decla"ed 
fro m exile In Ar gentina that his he alth p .. ohlblted fu .. the .. politIcal 
ilarticlpation. By means or th e subs e rv ient Tri buna l Supr e:lI o 
Ele ctoral, bo th a s ma ll Maoi st party and the small rerormlst 
Chr i stian Democrat ic party were ru le d In el igible on co ncocte d 
charges . IIhen the Partido Lib eral Radi cal were about to run a 
• bearded young cent rist nam.ed Franclsoo " Pancho " Hue r ta , further 
l eg al !lnagl1ng eUmlnated h i m, l ead i ng the PLR t o c hoose his uncle, 
t r aditionalist Raul Clemente Huerta. All th is maneuvering was 
des ign ed to pr oduce a f irs t-r ound presidential electio n in whi ch 
Huerta and eon servativ e candidat e Si xto Duran Ballen wo ul d l ead the 
!lel d. t hus ass ur ing a c ivili an president fu lly acceptable to the 
Armed Forces , no ~atter whiCh Of the two wo n. 
Anlong the lIIany ml soa lcu lations was the assumption that the CFP 
lIould crumb l e wi thout Bucara!ll as candi dat e . Instea d, the husband of 
his niece , Jai me Roldos Aguile r a . was tapped to carry the ba nner . 
Foll oO/ing a n alli anc e with the Christian Democra ts t hat p .. oduc ed a 
:Icke t pairing itol<los with Osval<lo Hu rtado , ~he TriDunal Supremo 
Elect o r al ba rred the Christian Democrats as well. They I n tt.!rn 
joined the e FP f o r the <lurati on o f t he campaign , l e aving the 
coalition intac t. Even s o, t he elections were expe cted to .. esol ve 
the Issue . To t he s urpr ise o r all and the dismay o r the military . 
the Rol<los- HUrtadO ticket won by a com f o rt able ma rg in. 55 This 
outcom e In Jul y 1978 p"oduced atte mpts by the Tribunal Sup .. emo 
t: lectoral rtrst to taInt . then to disallow the elec t ions . 
Co ns er vativ e politicians a nd the ir r Oll owe .. s also dissemInated 
governmen t-I nspl .. ed cha .. g8s of Mar x ism and ext remism , es peci a lly 
against Osvald o Ht.!rtado and international Chri stian Demooracy . 
"3 
Only atter- these and r-elated effor-ts (ailed did the Tr-ll,1m",!r-ate 
r-ecognlze the inevit able -- Includlng the ir own mi scalcu la tions and 
tact i ca l errcrs--wlth the I na<Jgllr-ation In August 1979 of a pr-e~ldent 
an4 vlce-pres\4ent (both I n their thir-ties) who wer-e avowe4 ly 
comllit ted to ~La Fuer-za del Cal!l.blo ~ (usually capped In Spani5h?}, 
the forc e of change. The effor-t to contr-ol the r-estaur-aclon might 
have 5ucceeded In thecr- y. The basic strategy seemed sound , b<Jt the 
tact i cal execution ... a s ~er'lously rlawed . The C.P d i d Mt collapse 
when B<Jcaram '~a s banned ; nonr-ecognition of thfl Chrlstlen~ ultimately 
str'eng thened the alliance with the CFP; and PanchO Huerta's being 
replaced by his uncle did not produce another strong traditIonalist 
candidate but merely weakened the prospects of Sixto Dur'n . Moments 
when the Armed For-ce~ might simply have canceled the entire pr-oces5 
wer-e numerous, but all ti me pa9~ed an4 opportunities wer-e lost , t he 
hesitation pr:Jved fatal . 
Uncertdlnty plagued the militar-y thr-oughout the thr-ee -
'::~;,::;::~'::; Its inter-nal dlllunlty, ~ymptOlJlat1c of the 
~ decay of allthor-itar-Ianl~m in O:cuador-, m\r-ror-ed a 
at critical mom ents. A~ each 5tep of the 
was pr-og resslv ely accomplis hed , It became mo r e 
Inter-r-upt the pr-ocess . In the en4 there lias no ;,,,1< >i"""'tlve to acq,deScence.56 
By the lillie the seven years of military r-ule came to a 
seelllingly ignominious conc lusion (cer tainly, to a less than glorious 
one) , the unpopulf,rlty of the regime had becom e lIlanlfaH . Eve~ the 
more nationalistic and r- efer-mist er-a under Ge neral RetlrIgllez Lara 
had cr-eated little popular support for the military. Meanti me , 
b uslne~~ sectors that benetited 1II0st crltlclzetl the reglllle 
nonetheless wror polley \ncon~lstencles , poor admlnlstr-ation, 
co~~uption , and wa3te of ~e8ou~ce8 on a~~aments ." Ho~e b ~o.dl y , 83 
Tho",as Sand e ~8 ob lle~ v ed , a ae SS8s te occ ~~~ed t hat , espe c ially by 
1979 , constlt~ted undeniable att ~ ition fo r mili t ary ~ul e. 57 Yet In 
li ght Of the I ns titu tional p ros~ess ", a<:l e during its t i me In pow er , 
much remaI ned to preserve , i nc l uding many le vers of In f l uence on 
~ nationaL a f f ai rs a nd pol i cy-m a king . 
Guayaquil's well - Infor med An41!sis Semana l obse~ved that as the 
mllita~y left governme nt, I t ... as by no means ~e tu .. ning t o the 
ba .... a cks In a l1te~.l sense. In con t~a8t to It:ll Situation in 1972, 
the lI] i l!ta~y ha<:l great ly enhanced Its Insti t u tional pe .. qulsltes and 
p~e~ogativell In a nU"lIbe~ of ways: the A .. med Fo~cell ~ece!ved 23 
pe~cent of annua l pet r oleum .. e venue ; they e njoyed the p o we~ to 
appoint membe~s to the boa~ds of dl~ecto~s of maJo~ state 
co~po~atlons ; they held a nea .. monopo ly on t .. ansp or tation through 
c ontrol of al~ and sea t"anspor t; Investments by t he Dlr e cclon de 
-ndustrias ",a<:le the A .. med Forc es a ma Jo" Indust r i a l sha r eholder ; and 
dl~ect par t icipa t ion In the appoIntm ent o f t he minister of deCenee 
wa~ a~sured . 58 I n add i tion . t i es wi t h ci v i li a n el1t e~ ha d be en 
enhanced by the growing p ~ .ctlce of ~etired o f flce .. s en te~ing 
bUllines~e8 a t In f luent i a l l e vel S o f manageme nt. Ot he~ r etired 
offlce~s began to participate In politics . Allong those who went on 
to beCOllle prominent f i gur es I n pa r t y affai r s loI i th i n t he ne x t deca<:le 
we r e Rene Vargas ?a z7.Os , Gustavo J a f'~{n , a nd Rlchelleu Levoye r . 
In.:stltutlonal and SOciet a l Chilracte~lstlcs 
" 
The Armed r orces' ~xperlence during their seven yaars In power 
(setting aside fcr the mOlllent debates over policy and the management 
ot national afrairs) were unquestionably marked by perceptible 
pro t e691onallzatlon and modernization. As a corporate body, the 
military not only greatly enlarged its sphere or activity and the 
opportuni ty t or materia l benet its but also moved steadily a way from 
its previous internal condition and st ructura l status . And whil e 
the expansive opportunities for individual and col l ective advantage 
were by no means Ignored, the ",Ultery did not engage In the massive 
bu l1 d~up that often cha r acterizes such circumstances In Third World 
nations. 
It Is true that the moat significant increa~e occurred in the 
:Hze of the Armed force~ , wh i ch grew from t' .. enty thousend in 1972 to 
thirty-five thou sand in 197 9 , as is Shown In t he data in Table 1. 
This rise in num~ers represented an inc reas e tram 3.2 memb e rs at t he 
' rmed forces per thousand Ecuedoreans to 4 . 5 memberll. Ml11tery 
expenditures rOlle frOIll 71 .. ill1on dollars in 1972 to 175 1II11110n In 
1979. In constant 1979 prices. the total increaaed tram 117 millIon 
to 175 million dollars. During the s allie period, however , the 
petroleum bonanza also prOduced an Increa~e In central govarnment 
e xpenditu r es fr om H5Q mUllan to $1 , 460 .. 1111on. As a consequence , 
the relative importance of military expe nditur es to government 
sperldirlg actually dropped sl i ght ly fro m 12. 1 percent to 12.0 
percent. 
r 
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TASLE ANNUAL EXPENDITURES OF THE ECUADOREAN MILITARY. 1972-1979 
RIll tary Armed Governlle nt Milt tar-y - Armed 
Expenditure:! Forces Expenditure s Governlllent Forces 
Current 1979 Member s Expend i tuI" es poe 
Year Im illion ij (mUllen 
" 
'<J 1000 
1972 
" '" 
20,000 750 , 5 . I) ) . 2 
1973 85 3' 20,000 990 1 3. ~ ) . , 
197~ 
" 
"7 20 , 000 1 • 09 ~ 12 .5 ).0 1975 
'" '" 
20,000 1 , I 6 8 1 ~ . 5 2.' 
1976 
'" '" 
2~ . OOO 1 , 281 13. ~ ). " 
1917 19) 225 ]0,000 1,1110 16 . 0 .., 
1978 
'" 
'90 35,000 1 , 392 13.1 ' . 7 
1919 
'" '" 
35,000 1,1160 12 . 0 "., 
D.C.: 
OrOee . 
More broadly, t he Ecuador"ean military duri ng its seven yours In 
power furthered its position and It s linkages with civilian socie ty 
whlle provldIng Ii oasis f o r a better and fIlo re mature r elatlonl:\hip 
" Ith the political p r ocess . At the same tiQe , the years since the 
"liLltary hft power testify amp l y to the r e l<lt ive adolescenee of t he 
institution. Internally . the proeess of Instituti onalizing has 
l argely supplanted the traditional military eaud illo who would rouse 
his garri.!lon with a "revolutionary proclamation" and lIIarch toward 
arllled co nfrontation . When direct intervention ta kel;l place , it 
c ustomari ly results from a collecti·te deCision at the highest l evel 
of the hi erar chy, as occurred in 1963 , 1972 , a nd 1976 . 
In the tirst in3tance, the senior commanders of the t hree 
branchea eon.stituted the Initial junta . In 19 72 , a united decision 
to intervene InCluded the de.slgnatlon of RodrIguez La ra as the 
senior officer . Although the situation in 1976 was more 
"7 
complicated , stl'ong agreement existed among a majority ot senior 
officers , Io' ith Dur'n and Poveda being the dOlllinant figur e s in the 
Armed Fo r ces at the ti me . The exper i e nce bet lo' een 191Z an<;l 1919 also 
unde r lined the hierarChical charaoter ot decision [!laking , ;,- hen the 
regime pl a ced ranking of rice rs as undersecretaries or subdl~ectors 
In all 1II1.nlstries and agenoLe .... headed by Civilians. Moreove,... Io'ith 
the excep t ion of the finance lIIinistry , most cabinet posts actually 
Io' en t to mi litary pe r sonne l. 
Dur ing the course of t he Mven year s . it was cOllllllon tor senior 
officers to ,"ove back and forth between ma jor troop oommands and 
government adlllin.lstrative posts. Also sig nificant was the avo lo' ed 
expectation that henceforth, the IIIlnlster ot defense would be a 
milita r y officer (altle l t occasionally rece,nly ret ired ) . This 
practice has been assiduous l y fol l owed by t h e three civ i lian 
presidents <lho have hel<l otflce to the pr esent (1988) , even t hough 
:.ne Incumbent has deViated (1'0111 the strict rel iance on seniority and 
Institutional pr oce<lures In place since 1919 . 
On 27 Febl'uary 1972 . the nelo' RodrIgue z Lal'a government decre ed 
the es t ablL, hme nt of t he I n<:ltit u to de Al tos Estudlos Millta res a s a 
command and gener al sta.ff school. Its objec t lve~ included 
Investigating and analyzing natIonal problems , studying 
polIcY[llaklng , and Improving executi on and I" plementatlon. The 
",1iitary government al~o undertook an upgrading ot the service 
acade mies. Such measures mit igated t he military ' s previous 
relIJctance to e ~a",lne politics an<l poliCies. Furthermore . the 
success or officers' career paths has becollle decreasingly dependent 
on ba ttlerleld aceolllplishments or Io'artlme exper ience . A greater 
• 
prem ium Is plaoed Inst ead on admInistratIve cO::Jpetenee • .,d, to II 
les"er degrse, on political 9k11 1 In manIpulating tile system fro,," 
within . 
os 
This tr end 1IJ an a"pec t of insti t utionalization that has been 
aftect ed by advanoed training at home and e~pec l al ly abroad . 
Ecuador's military has evolved II bureaucratic system of 
protes"lonallzlltion that i s eminently hierarchical troll the moment 
or recruitlllent Onward . Promotion" and professional advancelllent rely 
on ~reordalned regulations or senIority and service assignmen t , 
participation and achievement In cou"ses of study In Ecuador and 
abroa(! , ana cliaClplln eQ efficiency In pertorlJ!lng ac1mlnllltratlve 
responslt:l!lltles . Thl.!! hi e rarchical bureaucratization of the 
of f icer corps 15 accompa nied by a major " alphasl" on Institutional 
pr i de ana detense of the national patrltllony . Osval do Hur ta do has 
Jescribed this ealphasls we ll, 
. the militar y is a n institu t ion that wo rks vlsorously 
to keep alive patriotie sentiments In a sOCIety that is 
eK~erlenOing an Increasing deterioration of na t io nal pride . 
Soldiers are Indoctrina t e d In the da lly venerati on or 
national symbol s : the national anth e lll , the flag. the coat 
or ar al s , national territory, history . It ia ther ef ore not 
su r prising that the a r med f o r ces Identities completely 
with th e country and feels it s problellls and frustrat i ons 
mere I ntenaely than other Eouadoraans. 59 
Such sen ti ments are also but tressed by national security doctrine. 
A product or the Cold lol aI' , this doctrine cont e nds tha t IIIllltary 
auccess depends on the ability t o a""ure the survival of a count!'y 
and the protection of its Vital intere"ts. National derense and 
sovereignty a!'e viewed as depend e nt on the condition of domestiC 
atr a lrs . An in t ellectual framework was t herefor e devised by 
- ----
nrategists and theoreticlaml setting f::.rth t e raJs of poll e y for 
CQord irlating e conomic . diplomatic . and aJili t ary pe r sp ectI ves . • ... hat 
this perspective lee! to in consi derab le part was a growing interest 
in po l itics, with concern he i ghtening at moments o f apparen t 
Incompetenc e or corrup tion by Civil ian le aders.6 0 
Echolng once again the analysl:!! o f former President Hurtado. 
one can say that Ecuacto r ean orflcers know t heir country far be tter 
than /Dost other c it il;ens: ~Their constant wander ings enable t hem to 
ob serve firsthan d th e poverty, back.wa r dness . exploi tat i on, and I n 
general the widespread conditions of Injustice reig ning throughout 
the land .... [Their ] training is supplement ed by tha t received in 
other Ameri can ac ademies , where great emphasis Is plac e d on 
questions of ' Inte rna l security' and the str ugg le against 
':subv ersiv e movelllent:!! .,,,61 An I nev itable result has been the 
pOl1 tl cl za tion of the mil itary, wh ich ha s led officer", to take 
poll:Y preference>! along wIt h thelll ... hen I nterve nIng to over t hr ow a 
governlllent. MOreover, the preocc upa tion 'Jith nat iona l sec urit y 
doctrine i s accompani ed by the milit a ry belief that polI ti cal 
leaders unoerstanO ne Ither the concept nor It", Importance. 
Ne ar l y t 'Jo dec ades ago, military oftrcers sa id a >! much direc tl y 
to Fitch in direct Inte rvi e ws. Ite cit e", one offlcer who lamented 
ci vilian leader", ' Inabillty to under stand t he characte .. of na tional 
defense as a re sp onsibility or poll tical as 'Jel l as military 
authorlt!e:s. Anothe r Oe cLa red that the c ivilians "are not a ware o f 
their ro le In national der ense . Economi 5t9 . Industriali~ts . 
ag ri cult ural ist "" and gover nlllent o f flolals al l ha ve to tak e part In 
rormulatlng and e xec uting the national strategi c plan .n 62 Passage 
• 
• 
L 
ot the Na t Ional Seeurlt y La ~ under the Vel a sco ad~lnlstra t lon I n 
1960 produced little ot value at tha t time, a nd attitudes remained 
vl r tu"lly unchanged l.ulU l the mili tar y governme nt ot the 19109. 
Since then , new age coho r ts (p romODi anes) e .. e r glng t r orn the service 
academies con t inue to bring with t h em , more than ever , the attitudes 
and background typical o f the mi ddle sec t ors of socie t y . 
Alt hough data on t he soc i al ba ~es of re cr ll itme nt of the oHicer 
corps are softer than might be pref er r ed . 1 t Is clear that II 
pl'edolliinantly middle - class character has prevalled tor at least a 
half-century 1oI1th tew sig ns of change . Mo r e over , the number of 
recruits whose fathe r s were oftic ers has also remain ed small , 
dooumentlng the laCk Of a hereditary trail In the formation of new 
officars . The i r'l fluen ce of the mid dl e class i n the profes~iOAal 
tr ~ i!ling and prepa r ation prOVided a t the military schools and 
I nstlt 'Hes Is 01.1050 prevalent . One cono5equence has been the enduring 
l1abl1lty of the militar y t o crea t e a unit ar y positIo n in doctrinal 
or ideological terms . Thus Hthe e ffect of t he middl e class on Arm y 
ofrlcials--and by ex tenSion to th e rest Of the Armed Forces--
ef fectivel y st r engthens cen t ris m . ... H63 
J. second characteri stic of Ecuado r ean r e c r uit ment pa tte r nll , one 
already Cited , Is the continuing predominance or tholle military 
personnel ( r om the highl a nds . Dat a collect ed by John Samuel Fitch 
On t h e 1960s demo nstrated tha t th e nation 's demogra ph ic s hi f t s ( wi t h 
the coastal population outstripp i ng that of t he highlands , as 
• 
Cuay aqull did Quito) have In no sense been r eflecteCl in the 
mi li tary. In f a ct , " t he most s tr i king rea ture Of the army ' s 
geographical rec r uitment pattern" was exempl i fied by the fact that 
" 
Cuayu province, ..,I ~h one-fifth Of the nation'>! populati on, was 
providing barely 1 percent or nell cadets . The 3ame pattern was 
r eporte d in the 19105 by Augusto Vara:5 and Fernando Buatamante. As 
they argue<1, these pattern:! (urther elC;acerbated t he Arllled Forces ' 
difficulties in achiev ing doctrinal unity to replace t he prevailing 
Ideo logical dlrtusenass. 64 
Another quality characte r izing the EcuadOreal'l military is the 
i.prlnt of contact with foreign mIlitary trainer:! and a<1vlsers. The 
Armed Forces ot Ec ua dor have derived their modern ror~atlon from the 
• Italians, Chileans , and North Alllericans, and in tIIore reoent times 
(rom both t he Brazilians and the IsraeliS . '!at thiS openness to 
foreign Influences has not translated into a sharply d e t'lned 
tnst itutlona1 outlook . Even the contact with the Unit ed States has 
bee:> largely restricted to strictly professional training. To be 
.~llre , Ecuadorean pa rticipation on the Inter-,I,mer loan Defense Board, 
:"e! r extensIve tra in ing In u . S. service schools , and local adoption 
of U.S . textbooks have p .. rtlally predisposed the Ecuadorean Ull1lt>:lry 
toward North Am eri can va lues . Such Inrluence was notab l e In Olany of 
the pollcles qr the mIlitary Junta governing be t · ... een 1963 and 1966 . 
. But this inrluence .. aned consider ably by the tlOle the Armed Forces 
rei:llrn ed to power In 1972. Even so , U.S. pressures on the Con.3eJo 
Sup re~o de Goble r no to restore cons t itutional r ule became 
unm istakable ... hen Jimmy Carter assumed the presidency, and U. S . 
Olllitary personnel clearly shared In the presen tati on of 
~ashlngton'.':l views and prerer ences . 
• 
• 
All the~e iss ues hav e affect ed the in te rnal military structure , 
a ttI tude ll , and functioning or Ecuador-'s Armed For-ces in recent and 
contemporary times . They hav e a,1 '3 0 been pr-eserlted in considerable 
part as a man if es tati on of the nation ' s mili t ary in s titut ic ns under 
conservative authoritarian rule . My analysis would be relDiss, 
howev er, i t it d i d not consider the Ecuadorean e xperi ence s ince the 
purported "return t o the barrac ks" 11'1 1979. Ou r- ing the lIubsequent 
{Ive years of the Roldos-HurtadO adminilltration, senSItive ciyilian 
handling ,:of relatIons wIth the milItary were large l y sucee s~r\ll . 
The out break at another border sklrCllish with Pe r u 11'1 early 1981 led 
Prellident JaIme Roldos to e xpand already gene rous appropr-ia ti ons and 
rela ted ~uppc r t to the military. Wh en In May , he and his wI fe 
perished in a plane crash along with the general serving as lIIinister 
o f defen~e . tile Ar llled ,orces c l os ed ranks behind the politically 
irlsecure posi t ion of Osyaldo Hurta do as he as sumed t he presIdency. 
7he Institutional loyalt y or the military to oonstltutional 
legitimacy and th e carer ul attention of Hurtado to corp orate 
military concerns helped to asaure his lIurv\ val I n Or rlce and the 
smooth transition to the administration of Leon fe bres Cordero In 
.A ugu st 19 8~ . 
Since th a t time, however, ci v il-military r el a tions ha ve been 
less than Ideal rro~ the a om ent of fe~r9s Cordero ' s inauguration. 
His avowedly conservative Ol yi lian admlrlistratlon has suffered two 
major lIIi lltary upriSings, e ach one pr e emi nently bl:r.ar re. Wh Ile thIS 
paper Is rIOt t he place for a detail ed recounting of event s , some 
major ou t ll nes need eSt ablishing in order to clarity present 
polltioal te ndencies . The first outb urs t oame In March 1986 , when 
53 
the commander of the Ai r Force, Gen eral frank Vargas Pa:::zos, 
initiated a denunciat i on of other se nior off i cers on the grounds of 
corruption. Before the affair wa" settled, the structure of civ l l -
mllitary relations , as we ll as the alleged institutional unity of 
the Armed Forces, ha d been seriously questioned. Th e.'3e fissures in 
civil-military r elations reflected to no smal l e:<:ten t declSiond made 
earlier by Pres id ent Febre", Co r dero . 
For example, Gen e r'al l.u ls Pl nelros, in accord loI i th perso nnel 
regulations . had been r equi red t o apply for I"etirement In July of 
\'18~ . AnticIpating an appointment from Febres Cordero, he refu:led 
to do 80 and wa" angr i ly d l smls.sed by outgoing President Hll rtado by 
executive decree . <lit when rebres Cordero was ina ugurated , ho ',{ever, 
he annulled HurtadO ' s decree and named the reactivated Plneiros as 
hiS minis ter of defense. Th is 'dolation of mi. lit ary procedu r es and 
rule~ by Febres Corde r o h'as subseq uently repeated In Sim ilar 
~reside ntla l actions. I n another I nstance , the same personnel 1 ::0.'" 
of the Armed , orces specified tha t the Army commander woul d be 
selected from the three most se nior officers . rebres Cordero chose 
the third, Ceneral Edmundo Vlv er.o . but immediatel y dismlsstfd him and 
named hi s own candi date , Ceneral Manuel Mar[a Alb uja. who ranked 
only sixth in s uccession. 
Const a ntly unde r attack f r om t he political opposition on the 
grounds of a rbitrary r ule , feb res Cordero cont inued t o tak e a 
capricious path with the mili t ary. Bent on choosing perso nal 
fr ie nds amo ng the senior offIcer corp.'! for pr esidential favors , he 
proceeded according to hi:! own whim:; o f the r.lomen t . For example , 
di:l r up ted proce dur e and ru l es In matters o f promotion. When the 
h' 
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Co~ncl1 of Ar~y Orrlcers recommended that one brigadier general be 
proilloted to divi:lion general whll e denying the advance of another , 
Febras Cor dero block ed t he t ormer a nd promo t ed t he latter~ 4 Gener al 
Gualber t o Carrillo , who was then ass1gned as ch i e f of the 
presidential Casa ~Illtar. ThIs acti on produced mil itary pr otests , 
and subsequen t ne gotia tions Inaluded Minister of Gov e rnment Luis 
ilobles Plaza to safegua r d presidential interests . The compromise 
solution was to p romo t e both men , but membe rs ot t he Army's high 
command pointedly absented t hemselv e s Crom the orflclal ceremonies. 
A 31ml1ar epIsode occurred In t he Navy, ..,hen Febres Cordero 
overrode the CounCil of Admiral.:! to pr omot e Na v io Carela Mata fr om 
captain to adllliral . By imposing his wlll, the president caused hiS 
Navy commander , Adm!r-al Santiago Cor-a i, to r-e9lgn In pr-otest . 
Executive favo r i t ism ~as also demonstr-ated ~hen Minister- Of Defense 
?t ne l :'os kept two Air Force colonels on his starr who had not been 
ilpproved [or ~uch positions by the sllr-vice's CounCil o[ Gene r al s . 
Yet another violation of I nstitutional proc edures a nd prac t ices came 
", Ith the dismiss a l Of General HOllle r o 8e rr ezueU liS head of A:-my 
intelligence. He had private l y objected to ,ebres Cord ero ' s 
hanc~l1ng or a highly publLclz:ed :Cldnapplng . which resulted In the 
captive , Nhalm I s a!a s, be ing k111ed. Berrezu e t a was neither 
reassigned nor placed a t the disposit i on of the min is t e r or de fense , 
which made his the only option rorced retirelllent . 
All o f these act io ns have violat ed mili ta ry proc ... dures and the 
accepted pa tterns at civil - military relations In Ecuador. They aha 
callJe Into play I n t he no t orious affa ir at Frank Varg as Pazzos . ",hlch 
can only be s ke tched bri efly here.65 Ecuador' s most distingu ished 
Air Force of f1cer , Vargas Pazzos had become the service comm a nder as 
well as chief of the Joint Co~~and of the Armed Forces . 
ultimately became a major challenge to presidential auth ori ~y bega n 
when he so ught the r emoval of Minister or Defense Pineiros and Army 
Co mman der AlbuJa On grounds of cor ruption, illegal contr acts . and 
influe nce peddling. Af ter an a ng ry con frontation '"ith Pine ir05 on 
the mDrning of 7 March 1986 , Vargas Pazzos then rlew to the air base 
at Manta to oontinue his denunciations and demands . Meanwhile , 
Febres Cordero announced that he was replacing Vargas Pazzos, 
telling the nation that ~aquf no pas a na(la." 
Only after Febres Cordero failed to mobilize ot her branc hes 
again~t Var gas Pazzos di(l he agree to negotiate . Vargas Pa zz o::; 
returned t o Quito on the understanding t hat the two offi.cers he had 
(lenounced would be replaced and tha t they would be investigated and 
tried according to his allegations of corruption and inf l uence 
,,'!cdli ng. ilhen the pres1dent reneged , Vargas and loyal s ubo rdi nat es 
took control of the Quito Air forc e base. Only on 14 March , after 
f1ght ing tha t cost "everal li ve s , wa" the re belliOUS gen eral forced 
to sur r ender . In the months fo llowi ng , his case and cauee beca~e an 
ongoing national controver "y . servins as a political football for 
both the president and cong r essio nal oppo~ition . Civ il and military 
CO\lrts were involved . and the appearance of the I'.rmed Forces' 
unq \lestioned probity a nd unity '"as effectively shattered. 
Wh il e the fu ror was ~till going on . eVen more traumat i c events 
broke loose when Presid ent Fe br es Cor de r o was seized by paratroopers 
l oyal to Vargas Pazzos. On 16 J a nuary 1987 . the pr es ident landed at 
the Taurs coastal base on an inspect i on t rtp. He and his ento\lrage 
I 
I 
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proceedings . 
The gen.eral con.~ro'er'y wu (urther heightened a day later when 
eigh t y of the rebel Ail" Forc! eO~l'Iand05 ",ere forillally arrested and 
transferred to the S~cre ba:l~ In Quito. con~radlctlng the 
prellidentl;\l pLease Of llUu~lty. febres Corde r o " attorney general 
blithely I"e .. arked tllat the prOll!se was not .,alid and the law had to 
be upheld. Perha~, .Ol"e' hpona~t , ~Hltary ortl01el!! telt that 
this breach or dl~cipl!ne and ,l olatlon of hierarchy could not go 
unpun13hed. On 5 M.arch 1987, t he tormal Dou rtalert ial ot the t roops 
participa ting In the a!ralr was launChed. 66 JU.'Jt as the process 
began to unfold, publlc anention \ollIS diver-ted by a major earthquake 
and the consequent rupture of tl'le all n ow, 10Ihl ch led to new 
governnHHlt aUsterity lea~ure3 . 
~ven 30 , the e;nerglng political alll llil;io ns of GOrl e ral liar gas 
Pa:!.:z:oa I<ept the controversy sluerlng , e"pec ially arter his puollc 
-de;:! e r3enCe on 1 April 1967 . 67 The .. atter re"3"ulled center stage on 
21 July , when the Con'ejo de Guerra Verbal announced its verdict. 
Out of ninety-four paratrooper~ II ho had eventually been brought to 
trial , fifty-eight lIel'e found guilty. Seventeen received the 
maximum sentellce of Hxteen year~' illlprisonillent; tllenty - three got 
eight year,; one received t"olO years; and sevent!'!ell r!'!celved six 
months. General Varga:! Pazz03, whO had alr!'!ady charged feb res 
Cordero with breaking hi" .ord, declared hiS ~clldar1ty IoIlth the 
paratrooper3 . Cong r essional criti CS loIer" also voc a l, a l tho ugh t hey 
prudently avoided any direct action. But the ~rlll e d forces, 
preoccupied restoring dt3cipllne and Internal or der, consid ered the 
$entencing t o be r!ecessar-y . Yet tnstltutlonal lssue3 abounded., and 
1 
the relatlonshl;l ot the Plllitary to Civilian authority remained 
tenuous. 
" 
These damilg lng blows to c1v1l~m1l1tary relations, whlle 
resulting In considerab le part (rolll irresponsibility o r misjudgment 
on the part ot Leon reb r es Cor dero . sev erely ta~ed the interr1al 
unity o t t he Armed For ce:! . for It xa mple , suspicions .. ere revi ved I n 
the Air f o r ce that the Army intends to reincorporate it u a Ill ean.s 
or dlllllnl.shing the author ity, strength , and budget of Ita rival. 
The Navy , meanwhile . has looked askance at the long chain ot 
un::Javory and undisciplined aotions whlle holding itself aloo( . ThiS 
posture has scarcely endeared it to the other services. The Air 
Foroe has been disrupted internally , especi a lly given the in itial 
popularity ef Vargas Pa~~es , an e :TIetlenal ly unpredictable , but 
professionally s uperl er , officer and comm ande r, The Investigat i on 
:~to his charges a gainst Plnelros and Albuja could well turn up far 
'lcre seriOUS dishonesty than he Indicated at the outset. 
In shor t, there I" no way that t he Armed Forces , thalr 
corporate standing, their gradual modernIzation, and the ir 
lnstltut10nlll prid e and self-asteelll Clln escape long - term injury as 
the consequence of s eem i ngly comic - opera events . The bLtterness 
enge nd e red wa~ a;;'lp ly demonstrated on th e night of 10 August 1967. 
fol l owing Pres i den t Febres Cordero ' s an nual pre"ldentlal me ssage to 
Congress . A host of opposition deputies t hreat ened to require 
testilllony froll a number Of cabinet IIlnlsters , Including retired 
General Medardo Salazar, the minister of de!'ense. He promptly 
retorted that Congress had no right to play games with the honor o f 
the Ar!lled Forces . Two days later , he added that ~poLitl oal 
seetarlanh.:." "a~ dneanlng the prestige or t he ml.l1tary , to which 
conBre~'lonal representatives responded that their probletilS ... e,.., 
" ttll the ~Int~ te,.. not the ,\rmed force" as an instltution. li8 Th us 
tile antagonh:u re'llained keen'" Leon f eb res Cordero entered h13 
rlnal year 11'1 pOlle r and the e l ectio n campa ign began to unr O·l d . 69 
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i argued at the outset that linkages between reglme types and 
IIOdel, ot' poHcY -Daklng require oareful study . Although these 
topI cs Itave not cons tituted the major preoocupiltion he l"'e, they have 
nonetheless been relevant to ilssessing the Artrled Forces 11'1 EcuadOr. 
it WQuld SUI:! reasonable to conci llde , a t the least, that regime 
characterl5t ic~ do have an Impact on policy , a l though more refined 
analY:ll3 Is 80rely needed . 10 f'u r therillore , some thing s ubtle r than a 
1I1 1ll~1! S ~lc dlchotor:lY between a uthoritarian and plural i st reg l illes--or 
n!:wee n ",Uttary di ctato rsh i ps and civilian constitutlonallllm--Is 
requlre<l . ecuador's elperlence during the 1970s delllonlltrate~ 
complex i ty an<l change In clvll-mUltar:; relatiOn3. Moreover. poliCy 
prefe renCe3 also nrled , evotn when a llsesaing only the ROdr!guez Lar .. 
government and not the contrasts revealed <l u ring the rule of the 
Trlumvl~ate . The subseque ~t experience un der civilian rule , most 
particularly the divisiv e ly pugnaCious f'ebres Cor<lero 
administration, lias !yrther dramatized both the depth of Int ernal 
IIIllltary <llsunlty and the tenuoYlI Characte r of elv!l-tll1lltary 
reloltionshlps . 
1 
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Consequently, the El:uadorean calle doe:;! conftl'll) theories drawing 
sharp dls~lnctlons between the procedural and conte ~ tual dimensions 
of national po l ic y . In terms or rela t ionshi ps between th e military 
and civll1 a n interest groups , they are dHfu s e and weakly 
articulated . Given the debility ot Ecuad or ean partie:;! and interest 
g r oupe. It Is Illor' e fruitful t o 8:<plore the li nks with ma jor economi c 
and busine!:ls organ i~a tions . Yet the 8x;>er rence or recent years hilS 
leaned heavily on personalistic element.!! , Including the style and 
character of President Leon Febres Cordero and the chari smatic 
leadership ot General Frank Vargas Pa1!:zos. Much or the Interplay 
between t he two emanated from the absence of per sonal and 
Institutional pa ra ll e ls. Granted the level of moderrllzation in both 
political and military Institutions, this outcome Is scarcely 
surp r isIng . 
w1thout speculat ing about the course of t~e Ecuadorean mIlitary 
1 ~ t he .,ear f l.l tl.lre , it is a t least undenIable that the Institution 
Is passing through a deVelopmental adolescence. Just as Ecuador 
continues to struggl e through the stresses and c ha llenges of 
modernizat i on , so ar e the Armed Forces pressing for furth er and 
clear er self-definition. Wh Ile ther e has been Increased 
professlo nallz atlon , fe~ other broad issues have been resolved . 
Unity thus remains superficial at best and transitory in dUration. 
whether functioning under conservatIve rule (let alone au thorIta r ian 
conservative rule) O r not , t he Armed For ces have demonstrated 
perhaps less con,lstency than IIllght hav e been hypothesIzed . The 
core or the que,tlon r emains the military', decisive a nd 
Inextricable In t e r relationship s ~It h civilian political rorce~ an d 
" 
prevailing social mores and attitudes. 
• 
• 
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